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The aims of this dissertation are to uncover and analyse potential links between ethics and 
metaphysics – specifically, the theory of Forms – in the dialogues of Plato.  Drawing on 
material from a wide range of Plato‟s works, I investigate possible ways in which his theory of 
Forms might, at a very general level, converge with his moral theory.  To do this, I discuss 
each of the two theories individually, and then I consider how they might be connected.  
Therefore, I begin with an overview and critique of both the theory of Forms and Plato‟s 
ethics.  I argue that the theory of Forms is flawed as a metaphysical doctrine, largely because 
the postulation of Platonic Forms is insufficiently justified; Plato‟s moral theory, however, is 
far less problematic.  My analysis of the convergence of these two themes focuses on the 
following issues: the Form of the Good as it appears in the Republic; the Forms as a theory of 
moral properties; the meta-ethical position implied by the theory of Forms; and some 
possible epistemological links between the Forms and Plato‟s ethics.  In this analysis, I 
demonstrate how the weaknesses in the theory of Forms affect the interactions among his 
metaphysics, ethics and meta-ethics.  I argue that, while there are a number of points at 
which Plato‟s theory of Forms might converge with his ethics, the latter does not depend on 
the former in an essential way.  In addition, considering the problems with the theory of 
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The overarching goal of this dissertation is to investigate possible interactions between 
Platonic ethics and metaphysics.  In particular, I will focus on the theory of Forms, which is 
arguably the core of Plato‟s metaphysics.  I intend to consider in what ways, and to what 
extent, the theory of Forms grounds, influences, or merely converges with Plato‟s moral 
philosophy.  This requires a detailed study of Plato‟s general metaphysical and ethical 
theories, followed by an analysis of the relationships between the two.  My analysis of these 
relationships will examine how Plato connects the Forms to his moral views, as well as an 
assessment of whether such connections enhance or weaken Plato‟s moral theory. 
  
Considering the abundance of literature on many different aspects of Plato‟s works, some 
defence of my choice of topic is in order.  A great deal has been written on both Plato‟s ethics 
and his theory of Forms.  These discussions range in focus from general studies of Plato‟s 
moral and metaphysical theories to analyses of very fine points within these theories.  
However, comparatively less has been written on the subject of how Plato‟s ethics and theory 
of Forms interact with each other.  In order to further clarify, and justify, my choice of topic, I 
shall briefly mention some of the issues which have been addressed with respect to the 
connections between Platonic ethics and metaphysics, and then indicate how my focus is 
different. 
 
One topic in this area which has been covered extensively is Plato‟s conception of the good.  
In particular, much has been written on the Form of the Good in the Republic.1  Some 
                                                        
1
 Some examples: Julia Annas, “What Use Is the Form of the Good?  Ethics and Metaphysics in Plato”, 
in Platonic Ethics, Old and New (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 96-116; Nicholas Denyer, 
“Sun and Line: The Role of the Good”, in The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic, ed. G. R. F. 
Ferrari (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 284-309; Richard J. Ketchum, “Forms, 
Paradigms and the Form of the Good”, History of Philosophy Quarterly 11 (1994), 1-21; Gerasimos 
Santas, “The Form of the Good in Plato‟s Republic”, in Plato 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology, ed. 
Gail Fine (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 247-274; Samuel C. Wheeler III, “Plato‟s 












attention has also been devoted to the more general question of how Plato conceives of 
goodness.2  Discussions of this issue, however, tend to focus more heavily either on 
metaphysical or ethical aspects of the good rather than the connections between the two.  
This is not to say that these connections have been neglected altogether; but, as a slightly 
crude generalisation, discussions of the Form of the Good tend to focus more on 
metaphysical issues, whereas discussions of Plato‟s conception of the good tend to focus more 
on ethical questions about what Plato considers valuable things to pursue. 
 
Arguably, most of the literature on the convergence of Plato‟s ethics and metaphysics focuses 
on the Form of the Good.  However, other issues relevant to this topic have also been given 
some attention.  A few authors have discussed the relationship between Plato‟s conception of 
virtue and knowledge of the Forms.3  Plato‟s theory of Forms is also sometimes brought up in 
the context of meta-ethics, but it is often given only a passing mention rather than detailed 
scrutiny.4  In addition, some of the literature on Plato‟s ethics makes reference to the theory 
of Forms,5 but, again, these discussions are not focused primarily on the connections 
between the two theories. 
 
The principal way in which this study differs from those mentioned above is in the breadth of 
its focus.  What I aim to do is to provide an in-depth analysis of how ethics and metaphysics 
converge as global themes in Plato‟s thought.  This means that I shall examine his moral and 
metaphysical theories at a high level of generality and draw out the connections between the 
two.  Although I shall devote some attention to issues which have already been addressed, 
                                                        
2
 For example, Christopher Rowe, “The Form of the Good and the Good: The Republic in Conversation 
with Other (Pre-Republic) Dialogues”, in Plato and the Art of Philosophical Writing (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 239-254; Nicholas White, “Plato‟s Concept of Goodness”, in A 
Companion to Plato, ed. Hugh H. Benson (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 356-372. 
3
 For example, Julia Annas, “Moral Knowledge as Practical Knowledge”, Social Philosophy and Policy 
18 (2001), 236-256; David Wolfsdorf, Trials of Reason: Plato and the Crafting of Philosophy (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 86-145. 
4
 For example, J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), 
23-24; Hilary Putnam, Ethics Without Ontology, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2004), 17; Peter Railton, “Moral Realism: Prospects and Problems”, in Moral Knowledge? Ed. 
Walter Sinott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 50. 
5
 Such as, Terence Irwin, Plato’s Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), who devotes a 












such as the Form of the Good, I will focus mainly on the very general connections between 
Plato‟s ethics and metaphysics, which have not been covered much (if at all).   
 
The novelty of the focus of this dissertation is one reason why I believe this topic is worth 
investigating.  Through this analysis, I hope to uncover insights about Plato‟s philosophical 
theories and how they fit together.  In addition, I believe that achieving a better 
understanding of the connections among Plato‟s principal doctrines could yield worthwhile 
points about how ethics and metaphysics might be related more generally. 
 
The scope of the analysis I am undertaking is very broad in terms of the range of material on 
which I will be drawing.  This is because I shall not be focusing on one particular work, or 
group of works, by Plato, but will instead be considering his philosophy more holistically.  In 
other words, I will be investigating the interactions between Plato‟s metaphysics and ethics in 
general rather than analysing these themes in any single dialogue or group of dialogues.  An 
analysis of such generality requires studying many of Plato‟s texts, and, in what follows, I 
shall make references to a large number of these texts in order to support the conclusions I 
draw about his overall positions on relevant issues.  This does not mean, of course, that all 
the dialogues will be dealt with equally or similarly – the extent to which any particular 
dialogue is consulted will depend on which issues it covers and in how much detail it 
discusses them.  To prevent the analysis from becoming too abstract or speculative, I shall, 
throughout, make reference to specific works which address relevant points; however, my 
ultimate goal is to generalise about Plato‟s views from these particular discussions. 
 
The kind of approach I am taking undeniably has certain shortcomings, which cannot be 
ignored; however, these problems do not have a devastating impact, and this approach also 
has some advantages.  One concern which may arise for any project with a very broad scope 
is that a higher degree of breadth will come at the expense of depth.  That is, there may be a 












possible disadvantage, which relates specifically to the study of Plato, is that studying his 
philosophy holistically invites the temptation to impose more unity and consistency on his 
views than is warranted.  Considering the number of works Plato produced and the range of 
philosophical issues addressed in these works, there is at least some possibility that there are 
changes or inconsistencies in his views.  In analysing Platonic themes at such a general level, 
there is a risk that inconsistencies will be glossed over or that Plato‟s claims will be 
misrepresented in an attempt to make more coherent generalisations about his views. 
 
The first of the above concerns does not seem to pose much of a problem for my task here, as 
the broad scope of this dissertation is not liable to diminish its depth.  This is because the 
breadth of the focus consists in the number of Plato‟s works to be consulted rather than the 
number of issues to be addressed.  I shall be concentrating only on two major Platonic 
themes – morality and the theory of Forms – and these can be discussed in depth, even if no 
particular passages or dialogues are considered in detail.  Moreover, in order to provide a 
coherent and thorough analysis of these themes, it is obviously necessary to examine a 
number of narrower topics which Plato raises.  The generality of the focus does not preclude a 
nuanced analysis. 
 
The second issue – the danger of trying to impose more consistency on Plato‟s thought than 
there actually is – is a somewhat more serious concern.  However, the acknowledgement of 
this risk goes some way towards reducing it: provided one is sufficiently aware of this 
temptation and strives to represent Plato‟s views accurately, even if they contain 
inconsistencies, one should be able to minimise this danger.  In conducting my research, I 
have, therefore, endeavoured to be attentive to points in Plato‟s moral and metaphysical 
theories which may be obscure or contradictory.  Where appropriate, I acknowledge these 













There are also some advantages associated with the broad approach I am taking here.  For a 
writer as prolific as Plato, it seems valuable to study his work from a variety of perspectives, 
both narrow and broad.  Some of the literature on Plato is extremely narrow in its focus in 
that it discusses, for example, only a short passage within a particular dialogue; other works 
focus on one entire dialogue or group of dialogues.  The study I am undertaking here is a 
contribution from the broadest end of the spectrum, in that all of Plato‟s dialogues are 
potentially up for consideration. 
 
There is, in addition, a further reason why it seems especially appropriate to study Plato‟s 
works in this holistic way.  Whereas contemporary philosophy is divided into various sub-
disciplines (metaphysics, epistemology, moral philosophy, to name just a few), Plato does not 
draw or observe such distinctions, but instead weaves all these topics together.  From the 
perspective of modern philosophy, Plato‟s integration of these issues – which are now largely 
kept separate – is remarkable.  And because these philosophical fields are so closely 
interconnected in Plato‟s works, it seems quite appropriate to conduct a close scrutiny of 
these interconnections.  In doing so, we might uncover some valuable insights about the 
relationships among modern categories of philosophical inquiry. 
 
It must be acknowledged at the outset that studies of Plato‟s works are inevitably beset by 
certain obstacles relating to interpretation.  First, there is the obvious disadvantage of basing 
an analysis on translated works, as there may be subtleties in the original language which are 
lost when these texts are translated into English.  Secondly, there is considerable dispute 
regarding the order in which Plato‟s works were written.  This may hinder the analysis if one 
is concerned with change or progression in his thought.  Thirdly, the use of the dialogue 
format creates some challenges.  Because dialogues are both philosophical and dramatic 
works, they include certain literary but non-philosophical devices, such as irony, metaphor, 
hyperbole, and so on.  Such devices may, on occasion, make it difficult to discern Plato‟s 












made in the dialogues.  Finally, since Plato only expresses views through characters in 
dialogues, it is impossible to identify with absolute certainty which of the claims made are 
views of his own and which are supposed to represent the views of others.  This uncertainty is 
especially acute with respect to Socrates, who is the dominant speaker in the majority of 
Plato‟s works. 
 
The first of these obstacles (working with translated works) is really unavoidable; it is 
something which must always be borne in mind when studying Plato.  Should any 
interpretive problems associated with translation difficulties arise in the course of the 
forthcoming analysis, these will be acknowledged appropriately. 
 
The controversy over the chronology of Plato‟s dialogues is not too great a problem for a 
study with as broad a scope as this one.  Since my aim is to examine Plato‟s philosophy in a 
holistic way, it is not all that important whether certain works were written before or after 
others.  The only bearing which the chronology of Plato‟s works may have on the current 
analysis is that he may have changed his position on certain issues over time, so that the 
views he expresses in the “earlier” dialogues are different from (or even in conflict with) those 
of the “later” dialogues.  However, I have already indicated how I intend to deal with 
potential inconsistencies in Plato‟s thought and the question of whether these inconsistencies 
have a temporal element is immaterial to my present task. 
 
The last two interpretive issues I mentioned both concern possible difficulties in discerning 
which views Plato genuinely endorses.  It must be acknowledged that it is impossible to know 
with absolute certainty which of the claims Plato makes across his many dialogues are 
genuinely endorsed by him and which are introduced for some other purpose.  Nonetheless, 
some issues are discussed in such detail and with such frequency in his works that it is at 












concerning Plato‟s real views on particular issues, I shall indicate this and suggest how these 
uncertainties may affect analysis of his theories. 
 
In order to analyse the interactions between Plato‟s ethics and metaphysics, I shall firstly 
examine each of these themes in isolation and then consider how they are related.  Thus, I 
shall begin in Chapter II with an outline and critique of Plato‟s theory of Forms, followed in 
Chapter III by a discussion of his moral theory.  The central analysis of the dissertation will 
be undertaken in Chapter IV where, drawing on the issues covered in Chapters II and III, I 
shall discuss various connections between the theory of Forms and Plato‟s ethics.  In Chapter 
V, I shall close with a brief summary of my conclusions and some remarks on the broader 












II. THE THEORY OF FORMS 
 
Plato‟s “Forms” are abstract entities which feature in a number of his writings.  Because of 
the frequency with which Forms are the subject of discussion in the dialogues, they are a 
prominent Platonic theme.  Forms are central to Platonic metaphysics: they comprise a 
metaphysical system which classifies and imposes order on the fundamental structure of 
reality.  However, Forms are also raised in a variety of other contexts, not explicitly related to 
metaphysics, and, as a result, they appear to fulfil additional functions (beyond the 
metaphysical) in Plato‟s philosophy. 
 
I have two main goals in this chapter.  The first is to provide an overview of the metaphysical 
theory constituted by Platonic Forms.  This elucidation of the theory of Forms, at a general 
level, lays necessary groundwork for the analysis which follows in Chapter IV.  In my attempt 
to present a broad and coherent outline of this theory, I have drawn on many disparate 
discussions of Forms across a range of Plato‟s dialogues and tried to distill from these the 
central tenets of Platonic metaphysics.  In conformity with my overall approach (outlined in 
the Introduction), I have not analysed any single dialogue (or particular passages within a 
dialogue) in detail, but have instead made reference to a number of Plato‟s works which deal 
with Forms.   
 
My second aim in this chapter is to give a critique of the Forms as a metaphysical theory.  The 
analysis of the strengths and (especially) the weaknesses of the theory of Forms is crucial to 
achieving the overarching goal of this dissertation, because when investigating the 
connections between Plato‟s ethics and metaphysics, one of the questions I shall need to 
address is how, whether, or to what extent, the flaws in the theory of Forms affect Plato‟s 













Achieving a holistic picture of Plato‟s theory of Forms is both valuable in itself and an 
important component of my particular aims here.  However, there are certain difficulties 
which limit the extent to which a coherent exposition of the theory can be produced.  This is 
because Plato never provides a concise or straightforward statement of the metaphysical 
theory of which Forms are the centrepiece.  Instead, Forms are discussed in a variety of 
contexts, in varying levels of detail, and in a rather piecemeal way, which makes it difficult to 
present the Forms as a clear, consistent and systematic theory.  In fact, it may even be argued 
that it is too much to describe Forms as constituting a “theory” at all, given that they probably 
do not meet the criteria of contemporary applications of this term.  (Nevertheless, in what 
follows, I shall continue to refer to the “theory” of Forms, but the sense of this term may be 
somewhat looser than in its typical modern usage.)  Thus, while I have attempted to present 
as clear and coherent an overview of the Forms as possible, certain gaps and inconsistencies 
inevitably remain.  I have acknowledged these as far as possible and indicated where they 
constitute weaknesses in the theory of Forms. 
 
The first two sections of this chapter present my attempt to achieve a holistic picture of the 
theory of Forms.  I begin with the fundamental questions of what kinds of entities Forms are 
and how Plato understands them to be connected to particular objects in the physical world.  
Then, in the second section, I comment briefly on the metaphysical and other functions that 
Forms fulfil, or could potentially fulfil, in Plato‟s philosophy.  The final two sections contain 
my critique of the theory of Forms.  First, I consider some possible motivations for 
postulating Forms; then I outline a number of problems with the theory and draw a 
conclusion regarding how the Forms fare as a metaphysical doctrine. 
 
A. The Nature of Forms and their Relations to Particulars 
 
To give an exposition of Plato‟s theory of Forms, it seems appropriate to begin by clarifying, 












because Plato never provides a clear or direct explanation of what kinds of entities Forms are 
supposed to be.  In those dialogues which include discussions of Forms, they are often 
introduced as if the characters in the dialogue have an antecedent familiarity with them.6  
This is not very helpful to the uninitiated, who are required to learn about the nature of 
Forms by inferring this information from what is said during discussions in which they are 
more or less presupposed.  Based on what can be gleaned from such discussions, there are 
two broad rival positions which can be adopted with respect to how we ought to understand 
Platonic Forms: they can be construed either as universals or as paradigms.7  Each of these 
alternatives has different implications for the relations between Forms and particulars.  I 
shall discuss each position in turn. 
 
The first option, then, is that the Forms are to be understood as universals, much like those of 
contemporary theories of properties.  Thus, on this view, properties are universals and each 
universal is equivalent to a Form.  The implication of this interpretation for the relationship 
between Forms and particulars is as follows: particular objects in the world with a given 
property are instantiations of the universal of that property, and so they are instantiations of 
the Form of that property.  The Form of the property in question would be what all 
particulars with that property had in common.  In addition, according to this view, the Forms 
are immanent or “present” in all particulars which instantiate them.  So, for example, if the 
Forms are universals, then every particular circle in existence is an instantiation of the Form 
of Circularity, this Form is what all particular circles have in common, and the Form is 
immanent in every particular circle. 
 
The alternative position is that Forms are not mere universals, but rather paradigms or 
perfect exemplars of properties.  This would mean, for example, that the Form of Circularity 
                                                        
6
 For example, Phaedo, 65d; Protagoras, 332c; Republic, 476b.  All references to Plato‟s dialogues are 
taken from John M. Cooper, Plato: Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997). 
7
 Throughout this dissertation I shall make free use of modern terminology such as “universals”, 
“paradigms”, “properties”, etc.  Although such terms do not appear in Plato‟s own writings, they are 












is the most perfect circle possible.  If Forms are understood as paradigms rather than as 
universals, this implies that the relation between Forms and particulars is one of imitation as 
opposed to instantiation.  In other words, a particular with a given property would be an 
imitation of the Form exemplifying that property.  Moreover, Forms are, according to this 
interpretation, separate from corresponding particulars rather than immanent in them.  A 
Form is, therefore, not simply what all particulars with a certain property have in common; 
rather, what all particulars with that property have in common is that they all imitate a single 
Form. 
 
There may be the possibility of a kind of “hybrid” interpretation which would combine these 
two alternatives.  That is, one could take the view that Forms are both universals and 
paradigms.  This would imply, first, that Forms are both separate from and immanent in 
particulars; secondly, that a Form is both what all particulars with a given property have in 
common and the perfect exemplar of this property; and finally, that particulars both 
instantiate and imitate Forms.8 
 
With these competing conceptions of Forms laid out, it is necessary now to determine which 
of these views is the most accurate representation of Plato‟s own characterisation of Forms.  
In Plato‟s works there is support for both interpretations, which is of course why there is a 
division between these two views in the first place.  I shall now highlight some passages in 
Plato‟s dialogues which support one or the other of these positions, and I will argue that, 
although the evidence is mixed regarding Plato‟s genuine conception of Forms, it may be 
more plausible to attribute to him the view that Forms are paradigms rather than the view 
that they are universals. 
 
                                                        
8
 The difficulties faced by such a “hybrid” interpretation may seem obvious, but I shall discuss these 
later in this section when I consider which of the above alternatives is the most accurate 












I shall begin by examining some passages in Plato‟s dialogues which seem to support the first 
position, that Forms are universals.  Plato never describes Forms as “universals” himself, but, 
in places, there are quite clear suggestions that Forms are thought of as “present” in objects 
with the relevant properties and that particulars instantiate Forms.  One general piece of 
evidence for this conception of Forms comes from some of the terminology which is used in 
various dialogues to describe the relationship between Forms and particulars.  In several of 
Plato‟s works, it is said that particular items in the world which have a certain property 
“participate” or “share” in the Form of that property.9  Such terminology appears to support 
the notion of Forms as universals because it implies that Forms are in some sense a part of 
particulars with the relevant properties, or that Forms are (at least partially) present in these 
particulars.  This suggests that Forms are something like universals which are instantiated, 
rather than paradigms which are imitated. 
 
Further support for this interpretation of Forms can be found in the “Socratic” dialogues.  
These dialogues are characterised by Socrates‟ close questioning of his interlocutor(s) 
regarding the definition of some (usually moral) concept.10  In these discussions, Socrates is 
asking for an explanation of what is common to all instances of a certain property, or the 
common essence which is present in all particulars with this property.  For example, in the 
Euthyphro, Socrates questions Euthyphro about the nature of piety, asking not merely for 
examples of pious actions, but for an account of piety itself.  If what Socrates is seeking in 
these dialogues is an explanation of the Forms of each property, then the conception of 
Forms which he (or Plato) has in mind does seem to be that of universals which are 
instantiated (and hence present in) those particulars. 
 
There are also, however, several passages across Plato‟s works which provide support for the 
contrary view, that he conceives of Forms as paradigms which are distinct from and imitated 
                                                        
9
 For example, Parmenides, 129a, 131e; Republic, 476d; Symposium, 211b.  The Greek verbs used are 
“μεταλαμβάνω” (in the Parmenides) and “μετέχω” (Republic and Symposium), both meaning to 
“partake” or “get a share” of something. 
10












by particulars.  That Forms exist separately from and independently of their corresponding 
particulars is suggested by the claim, which appears in a few dialogues, that a Form exists 
“itself by itself”.11  This phrasing is a little cryptic, but it does hint at the idea of Forms‟ being 
independent entities which exist in their own right, rather than merely what is common to all 
instances of a given property.  However, clearer expressions of the separateness of Forms 
occur in dialogues where it is explicitly said that the Form of a property is distinct from 
individual items in the world which possess that property.12  There are also some passages 
which suggest that Plato thinks of the relationship between Forms and particulars as one of 
resemblance or imitation.  For example, in the Phaedo, it is said that the many equal objects 
in the sensible world are like the Equal itself, though deficient in comparison to it,13 and, in 
the Republic, the just person is described as being like “the just itself”.14 
 
The passages cited above clearly indicate that the evidence is mixed with respect to whether 
Plato conceives of Forms as immanent universals or separate paradigms.  There is perhaps 
more support for the latter interpretation, considering the greater number of references in 
the dialogues to Forms‟ being separate from and imitated by particulars; however, the 
evidence for the alternative view cannot be disregarded.  Thus, in order to come to a general 
conclusion about Plato‟s theory of Forms, it is necessary to determine what can be inferred 
from these conflicting pieces of evidence.  I shall consider four conclusions which might be 
drawn. 
 
The first possibility, to which I have already alluded, is that Plato‟s theory of Forms is a 
hybrid of these two views, and this hybrid is consistent.  That is, it might be argued that Plato 
understands Forms as both universals and paradigms and that, contrary to appearances, 
                                                        
11
 For example, Phaedo, 78d; Symposium, 211b. The Greek phrase used in both these passages is “α τo 
καθ’ α τo; “itself by itself” is the literal translation of this phrase.  
12
 For example, Phaedo, 74a-c (the Form of the Equal); Republic, 479a (the Form of the Beautiful). 
13
 Phaedo, 74d. 
14












these positions are not in tension with one another.15  The obvious, and substantial, challenge 
faced by such an interpretation is how these two conceptions of Forms are to be reconciled 
with one another.  It is not clear how Forms could be both immanent in and separate from 
particulars, as these two qualities seem to be fundamentally opposed to one another.  To 
make such an interpretation credible, considerable argument would need to be given to show 
how these two alternatives could be coherently combined. 
 
The second possibility is that Plato endorses both positions, but that he simply fails to 
recognise the incompatibility of the two views.  This is an unappealing conclusion for those 
who are loath to attribute such blatant confusion to Plato.  In any case, it is unlikely that Plato 
would be blind to such an obvious inconsistency since he is so careful and rigorous in other 
areas.  Moreover, the extended assessment of the Forms in the Parmenides suggests that 
Plato is aware of at least some of the difficulties in his metaphysics and that he is not above 
self-criticism.16 
 
The third conclusion which might be drawn from the mixed evidence on the nature of Forms 
is that Plato changes his mind on this issue; he progresses from conceiving of Forms as 
universals to thinking of them as paradigms.  This interpretation is supported by the fact that 
the passages supporting the idea of Forms as universals are more prominent in the “Socratic” 
dialogues, which are standardly classified as “early” works in Plato‟s career, whereas the 
depictions of Forms as paradigms appear more frequently in what are considered the 
“middle” period dialogues.  There is thus some plausibility to this view, but it still requires an 
explanation of why Forms are sometimes spoken of as if they are universals and as if they are 
paradigms within a single dialogue.17 
 
                                                        
15
 This sort of interpretation is defended in Eric D. Perl, “The Presence of the Paradigm: Immanence 
and Transcendence in Plato‟s Theory of Forms”, The Review of Metaphysics 53 (1999), 339-362.  
Perl argues that there is no tension between the claim that Forms are separate from particulars and 
the claim that Forms are immanent in particulars.  
16
 I shall discuss some of the Parmenides‟s criticisms of Forms in the final section of this chapter. 
17












The final possibility is that Plato only ever endorses one of these conceptions of Forms and 
the alternative is not his genuine position: specifically, Plato himself views Forms only as 
separate paradigms and the idea of Forms as universals is Socrates‟ position, not Plato‟s.  
This conclusion is supported, first, by the aforementioned fact that the evidence for Forms‟ 
being immanent in particulars is heavier in the “early” or “Socratic” dialogues, and, secondly, 
by Aristotle‟s remark that Socrates conceived of Forms as universals and that it was Plato 
who considered them as separate entities.18  To interpret Plato‟s conception of Forms in this 
way is also, like the previous interpretation, to assume a degree of change or transition in 
Plato‟s thought, except that in this case the change is not a modification of Plato‟s own views 
but rather a transition from reporting Socrates‟ ideas to developing his ow . 
 
Of the possible conclusions outlined above, the last is probably the most plausible.  First, as I 
have already mentioned, when considering Plato‟s works all together there are, on balance, 
more clues that Forms are to be understood as paradigms rather than universals.  Secondly, 
there is a fairly clear difference between the sense in which “Form” is used in the “Socratic” 
dialogues and the sense in which it is used in the “later” dialogues.  Forms in the “Socratic” 
dialogues are depicted as something fairly metaphysically unambitious (like universals) in 
comparison to how they are presented in other dialogues dealing with Forms.  Finally, what 
gives the last of the four interpretations an advantage over the rest is that it is the only one for 
which there is external evidence that this is indeed Plato‟s own position. 
 
Consequently, for the purposes of the forthcoming analyses (later in this chapter and in 
Chapter IV), I shall assume that Plato conceives of Forms as distinct, independent entities, 
and that they are paradigms of properties which particulars in the sensible world imitate.  
However, it must not be forgotten that there is evidence for another conception of Forms in 
Plato‟s works and that this creates a tension in his metaphysics.  Even if, as I have suggested, 
this tension could be explained, the explanation is not foolproof.  It is especially problematic 
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that both conceptions of Forms sometimes seem to appear within a single dialogue.  
Therefore, my acceptance of the interpretation of Forms as paradigms is tentative.   The 
uncertainty about the exact nature of Forms and their relations to particulars produces a gap 
which undermines the theory of Forms as a metaphysical system. 
 
B. The Roles of the Forms 
 
I shall, therefore, proceed with my analysis of the theory of Forms on the assumption that 
Forms are the kinds of entities which exist separately from objects in the perceptible world 
and which provide paradigms for these objects.  But, regardless of whether Forms are best 
understood as universals or as paradigms, it is undeniable that they occupy crucial roles in 
Plato‟s philosophy as a whole.  In this section, I shall briefly highlight some of the functions 
that Forms fulfil in various contexts, including metaphysics, epistemology, political 
philosophy, and ethics. 
 
As the preceding discussion should clearly illustrate, the most obvious and fundamental roles 
of Forms are metaphysical ones.  Forms both impose a two-tiered structure on reality and 
provide a theory of properties.  With the postulation of Forms, reality is divided into two 
distinct realms: the realm of concrete, perceptible objects, and the realm of abstract Forms.  
And the theory of Forms can provide an account of properties because it implies that what all 
particular objects with a given property have in common is their relation (presumed to be 
some kind of resemblance or imitation) to a relevant Form.  Plato sometimes describes the 
relationship between Forms and corresponding particulars even more strongly by suggesting 
that it is Forms which cause these particulars to have those properties.19 
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Because the different regions of Plato‟s philosophy are so interconnected, the (primarily 
metaphysical) theory of Forms also arises in discussions which are not explicitly concerned 
with metaphysical issues.  For instance, Forms come up in contexts which would be more 
accurately considered epistemological than metaphysical – that is, when the discussion is 
about some aspect of the nature of knowledge or what can be known – and they are 
sometimes presented as the objects of knowledge.  In the “Socratic” dialogues, where the 
elucidation of a certain (usually moral) quality is sought, it is suggested that knowing the 
quality in question involves knowing the Form of that quality.  Although I indicated earlier 
that the conception of Forms in these dialogues is different, in certain respects, from the 
conception in “later” dialogues, the connection between Forms and knowledge is a 
continuous theme in Plato‟s thought, even if the nature of Forms is not consistent across all 
of his works.  In the “middle” dialogues, most notably the Phaedo and the Republic,20 Forms 
are described as being accessible only through reason or intellect, in contrast to the 
perceptible world which is discernible through the senses.  There may also be some reason to 
think that Plato believes that only Forms can be true objects of knowledge.21   
 
Forms also feature, to some extent, in Plato‟s treatment of political and moral issues.  They 
are most directly linked to his political philosophy in the Republic‟s discussion of the ideally 
just state.  This state is to be governed by philosophers, who alone are acquainted with 
Forms, especially the Form of the Good.22  The purported superiority of the knowers of 
Forms hints at the moral significance Plato attaches to knowledge in general, and to 
knowledge of the Forms in particular.  Forms feature in various ways in Plato‟s ethics, and, 
since the ultimate goal of this dissertation is to uncover these connections, I will delay 
discussion of them until my analysis in Chapter IV.  For now it is important only to note that 
Forms feature significantly in other areas of Plato‟s philosophy besides metaphysics. 
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C. Arguments for Forms 
 
In the preceding two sections I attempted to provide as coherent an account as possible of the 
nature of Plato‟s Forms and the various purposes they fulfil in his philosophy.  I shall now 
move on to my assessment of the theory of Forms, beginning, in this section, with the 
positive half of the evaluation. 
 
Plato‟s theory of Forms undeniably has certain attractive features, such as its elegance as a 
metaphysical system and its potential explanatory power, not only in metaphysics but in 
other areas too.  However, if the Forms are to constitute a plausible metaphysical theory, 
there must be compelling arguments to demonstrate their existence.  Plato himself does not 
provide very much by way of explicit argument for Forms, and in some dialogues their 
existence seems to be simply assumed.  In places, Plato does gesture at motivations for 
positing Forms, but these tend to fall short of substantive arguments.  Nevertheless, even if 
Plato does not develop these lines of argument himself, they can be developed on his behalf; 
indeed, they have been developed on his behalf, most notably by Aristotle.  Aristotle provides 
some helpful information regarding what might have motivated Plato (and others) to 
postulate Forms.  Therefore, in what follows I shall consider what arguments may be given in 
favour of Forms, based not only on Plato‟s own writings but also on Aristotle‟s. 
 
The first argument for Forms which I shall consider is the well-known “One over Many” 
argument, which Aristotle discusses and which has been preserved in contemporary 
metaphysics‟ theories of properties.  A version of this sort of argument can be found in the 
last book of the Republic.23  The argument begins with the simple observation that certain 
properties are predicated of multiple particulars in the world.  For example, there are 
multiple objects in the world which are round, which have the property roundness, or to 
which the predicate “round” can be applied.  The next premise in the argument is that the 
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property predicated of these particulars is not identical to any of these objects: in speaking of 
the property “roundness” we do not refer to any particular round object, but to something 
which transcends all the particular instances of roundness.  Therefore, the argument 
concludes, a property cannot be a particular but must rather be something which exists in 
addition to particulars with that property.  Clearly, when this argument is applied to Plato‟s 
theory of Forms, the conclusion is that what exists in addition to particulars with a given 
property is the Form of that property.24 
 
The “One over Many” argument is appealing in its simplicity which borders on intuitive 
obviousness – it is virtually impossible to deny that there is something which all particulars 
with a shared property have in common and which is (in some sense) distinct from any single 
instance of that property.  However, there are (at least) two reasons why this argument does 
not provide a good enough motivation for accepting that there are Platonic Forms.  The first 
is a general problem with the argument which arises whether it is invoked to establish the 
existence of Forms or some other conception of properties (e.g. universals).  The problem is 
that accepting the reasoning of the “One over Many” argument commits us to recognising 
Forms (or universals, or whatever the argument is being used to establish) of far too many 
properties.25  This is because the argument would imply that there must be a Form 
corresponding to every conceivable property, and this includes, for instance, disjunctive 
properties (e.g. round-or-square), negative properties (e.g. not-round) and indefinitely many 
other arbitrary absurdities.  Although I shall argue in the next section that it is not clear 
precisely which Forms Plato does and does not acknowledge, it is certainly safe to say that he 
does not postulate a Form corresponding to every property that could ever be imagined. 
 
The second problem with the “One over Many” argument relates specifically to Platonic 
Forms.  While the argument may be able to show that there is something which is common to 
all particulars with a certain property, it does not go far enough to show that this 
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commonality involves a Form.  What is common to all particulars with certain properties 
may be something far less metaphysically ambitious (such as mere universals) than Forms as 
Plato conceives them (that is, as paradigms which exist separately from, and independently 
of, items in the sensible world).  Therefore, the “One over Many” argument, when applied to 
Plato‟s Forms, proves both too much and too little: too much, because it would imply that 
there is an over-abundance of Forms, and too little, because it cannot establish that what is 
common to all particulars with a given property is a Platonic Form of that property.  
Consequently, the argument cannot provide any real support for the theory of Forms. 
 
Another prominent motivation for positing Forms, which can pote tially provide the 
foundation for more than one argument to establish their existence, is the view that the 
sensible world is not a stable reality because perceptible objects are in a constant state of flux.  
This doctrine is thought to originate from Heraclitus; Aristotle reports that Plato was 
sympathetic to it and that it was one of his motivations for developing the theory of Forms.26  
There are certain passages in Plato‟s dialogues which do appear to refer to, or at least gesture 
at, the principle of constant flux.  One of the clearest expressions of this idea in Plato‟s works 
can be found in the Phaedo, where it is said that “the many beautifuls” (i.e. the many 
beautiful particulars), “the many equals”, and so on, are never the same but always changing; 
what the senses perceive as beautiful, equal, etc., are not constant but rather in a state of 
flux.27 
 
Despite Aristotle‟s claim, and the evidence in Plato‟s own works, there is some controversy 
regarding whether Plato genuinely or consistently accepts the doctrine of constant flux.  
Nevertheless, the doctrine is worth considering here because it can potentially provide the 
foundation of important arguments for the existence of Forms.  Therefore, I shall proceed on 
the assumption that Plato does endorse the principle of constant flux, and investigate how 
this principle might motivate the postulation of Forms. 
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There is clearly a stark contrast between this doctrine‟s depiction of the sensible world and 
Plato‟s depiction of Forms: whereas perceptible objects change, disintegrate and assume 
different properties, Forms are eternal and unchanging.  What needs to be established now is 
how accepting the principle of constant flux might motivate the postulation of Forms, to 
which this principle does not apply.  Aristotle suggests two arguments which can be 
constructed on the basis of the principle, one concerning definitions and one concerning 
knowledge.28   
 
The first argument, then, is the “argument from definitions”.  Aristotle reports that Plato 
inherited from Socrates the interest in seeking definitions of important philosophical (and 
typically moral) concepts,29 and this is, of course, also evident from the style of many of 
Plato‟s own works.  These searches for definitions are attempts to determine the common 
essence of all particulars which have the quality in question.  The “argument from 
definitions” combines the belief that there are such common essences with the principle of 
constant flux in order to establish that there are Platonic Forms.  The argument can be 
expressed as follows: since sensible particulars with a given property are in constant flux, the 
definition of this property cannot be a definition of a sensible particular, because anything 
whose nature is unstable and variable cannot be defined.  However, it is possible to give 
definitions of the properties of sensible particulars.  Therefore, these definitions must be of 
something fixed and unchanging.  It is Forms which fit into this role in Plato‟s philosophy; 
hence, the argument concludes, there must be Forms to feature as the objects of definitions.30 
 
The second argument based on the doctrine of constant flux is the “knowledge argument”.  It 
takes much the same form as the “argument from definitions”, but it concludes that Forms 
are required to serve as the objects of knowledge rather than definitions.  Thus, the argument 
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begins, as before, with the premise that objects in the sensible world are in constant flux.  The 
next premise is that it is not possible to know something which is in such flux.  Since 
perceptible objects are in flux, it follows that they cannot be the objects of knowledge.  
However, because knowledge is possible (this is assumed), this knowledge must be about 
something; and if it cannot be about sensible particulars, it must be about something which 
transcends these particulars and which is not in a state of flux as they are.  Therefore, the 
objects of knowledge are Forms, which are fixed and unchanging, unlike the sensible world.31 
 
The success of the “knowledge argument” and the “argument from definitions” depends, 
crucially, on the plausibility of the doctrine that the sensible world is in constant flux.  It is 
difficult to determine just how plausible this doctrine is, because it is not altogether clear 
exactly in what sense perceptible objects are always “in flux”.  When Plato makes reference to 
this idea he seems to assume that its meaning is obvious, but this seems unlikely to be as 
obvious to Plato‟s readers as he takes it to be.  Without a clear and determinate sense of the 
principle of constant flux, it is not possible to evaluate it meaningfully.  However, it would 
take me too far afield to consider here all the possibilities of what this doctrine might mean.  
Instead, I shall simply assume (charitably) that the idea that the sensible world is in constant 
flux is both easily understandable and sufficiently plausible, and I will evaluate the above 
arguments for Forms having granted this premise.  In other words, I wish to consider 
whether the conclusion of the above arguments (i.e. that Forms exist) follows from the 
premise that the sensible world is in constant flux.  I will argue that it does not follow. 
 
In addition to the principle of constant flux, the arguments from definitions and knowledge 
assume that the objects of knowledge or definitions cannot be entities which are in flux.  It is 
certainly not implausible to maintain that something which is in a state of flux can be neither 
defined nor known, for surely if knowledge and definitions are to be about anything then they 
cannot be about things whose inherent natures are unstable.  Thus, so far, it has been granted 
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that: (i) the sensible world is in constant flux; (ii) things in constant flux can be neither 
known nor defined; and (iii) therefore, the objects of knowledge and definitions are not 
sensible particulars.  However, this does not go far enough to establish that knowledge and 
definitions are about Platonic Forms.  The reason for this is that the arguments based on the 
principle of constant flux are essentially negative arguments, in the sense that they can only 
show what the objects of knowledge and definitions are not.  That is, these arguments, if they 
succeed, only establish that definitions and knowledge are not about sensible particulars, 
which does not entail any conclusions regarding what knowledge and definitions are about.  
In order to demonstrate that Forms are the objects of knowledge and definitions, further 
(positive) argument to this effect is necessary.  The arguments based on the doctrine of 
constant flux, however, fail to create a bridge between the negative conclusion, that the 
objects of knowledge/definitions are not sensible particulars, and the positive conclusion, 
that the objects of knowledge/definitions are Forms.  Therefore, even if the principle of 
constant flux can provide some motivation for postulating Forms, it cannot plausibly 
establish that Forms exist. 
 
The final argument for Plato‟s Forms which I shall consider is commonly referred to as the 
“compresence of opposites” argument.32  It is given this name because the argument makes 
reference to the phenomenon of a single object‟s possessing two opposing properties at the 
same time.  For example, a cat will have the property of largeness when compared to a 
mouse, but will have the opposite property – smallness – when compared to an elephant.  
This phenomenon of the “compresence of opposites” is invoked to demonstrate that 
properties cannot be particulars; they must, therefore, be Forms.  The argument is as follows.  
Sensible particulars are not “pure” instances of properties, because they can simultaneously 
instantiate two conflicting properties.  (So, for example, a cat is not a pure instance of the 
property of largeness, as it instantiates the opposite property – smallness – at the same 
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time.)  Therefore, a property P must be something which transcends all particular instances 
of P.  The property is itself purely P, because what serves as the common essence of all 
instances of P cannot, in any way, be not-P.  This motivates the postulation of Forms because 
they have precisely the qualities necessary to fulfil this role: the Form of P, in contrast to any 
particular object with the property P, is constantly and eternally P.  It is not the case that it 
has the property P in comparison to some things and the property not-P in comparison to 
others.  It is, instead, purely, absolutely, and unqualifiedly P. 
 
The “compresence of opposites” argument has clear affinities with the arguments based on 
the doctrine of constant flux.  The two lines of argument may even be combined: perceptible 
objects are subject to the compresence of opposites because they are in constant flux.33  
However, the “compresence of opposites” argument does not require the doctrine of constant 
flux and can be advanced as an independent argument for Forms. 
 
It is virtually undeniable that sensible particulars are indeed susceptible to the phenomenon 
of “compresence of opposites” in the sense outlined above.  This argument, however, has at 
least two shortcomings which cast doubt on its ability to establish the existence of Forms.  
First, the argument can only apply to properties which are characterised in pairs of opposites 
– large and small, beautiful and ugly, just and unjust, and so on.  The “compresence of 
opposites” argument could not show that there are Forms of properties which do not admit of 
such pairings.  There are only some properties which can simultaneously co-occur in a single 
object.  For example, a cat can at the same time be both large (in comparison to the mouse) 
and small (in comparison to the elephant); but it could not be, for example, both a cat and 
not a cat, or both four-legged and not four-legged, at the same time.  The argument can, 
therefore, not have any force with respect to the latter kinds of properties. 
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Whether this is a problem or not depends on which Forms are to be included in Plato‟s 
ontology.  If he intends to recognise only those Forms which occur in pairs in the way 
described above, then this limitation of the “compresence of opposites” argument is 
unproblematic.  But if there are to be Forms of properties which are not characterised in 
pairs of opposites, then the argument cannot explain why we should accept that those Forms 
exist.  As I shall argue in the final section of this chapter, Plato does not clearly specify which 
properties have corresponding Forms and which do not.  This makes it impossible to assess 
whether the restricted scope of the “compresence of opposites” is a real problem or not. 
 
A second, and more damaging, criticism of the “compresence of opposites” argument is that 
it does not go far enough to establish that there are Forms.  Like the arguments based on the 
doctrine of constant flux, the “compresence of opposites” argument cannot prove that 
Platonic Forms exist because it reaches a negative conclusion, which does not entail this 
further positive one.  The argument can only demonstrate, at most, that what is common to 
all particulars with a given property is not identical to any particular instance of that 
property, because the particular instances of the property co-occur with instances of the 
opposite property.  But, again, this does not entail the (positive) conclusion that the common 
essence of these instances of the property is a Form. 
 
This concludes my survey of the arguments for the existence of Forms.  The arguments I have 
discussed may provide some insight into Plato‟s motivations for postulating Forms.  
However, they all share a common weakness: none of them is able to establish the existence 
of Forms as entities which exist separately from sensible particulars.  The failures of such 
arguments create a substantial problem for the theory of Forms.  Any metaphysical system 
which postulates entities beyond those of ordinary experience will only be plausible if 
considerable justifications for such entities are given.  Plato has not provided adequately 












constitutes a significant weakness in his metaphysical theory.  I shall return to this point in 
Chapter IV when I analyse the connections between the theory of Forms and Plato‟s ethics. 
 
D. Criticisms of the Theory of Forms 
 
In this final section of the chapter on the theory of Forms, I shall consider some of the most 
significant criticisms of the theory.  The conclusion of the previous section is itself an 
objection to the theory of Forms: that Plato has not given adequate arguments for the 
existence of Forms is reason to object to the metaphysical system founded upon them.  In this 
section I shall raise three more problems with the theory of Forms.  The first is Plato‟s failure 
to specify the range of Forms – that is, which Forms exist and which do not.  The second is 
the puzzle concerning how Forms are related to particulars with the corresponding 
properties.  Finally, I shall address an objection to the theory of Forms which deals with the 
phenomenon of self-predication and leads to the so-called “Third Man” argument. 
 
There is a significant deficiency in Plato‟s theory of Forms because the scope of Forms is left 
entirely undetermined.  Plato does not clearly specify which Forms exist, nor does he provide 
an account of why there are Forms of certain properties but not others.  From discussions of 
Forms in various dialogues, it is evident that he almost certainly does recognise some Forms 
and that he almost certainly does not recognise some others; however, in between these two 
extremes is a wide range of properties which may or may not have corresponding Forms, and 
there is no explanation as to how we can distinguish systematically between those properties 
of which there are Forms and those of which there are not. 
 
The Forms which definitely do seem to exist in Plato‟s ontology include those of value-laden 
properties, particularly goodness, justice and beauty.  That Plato recognises these Forms is 












various dialogues.34  The properties which almost certainly do not have corresponding Forms 
include the very lowly and mundane – well-known examples given in the Parmenides are 
mud, dirt and hair.35  And then there are those properties for which there may or may not be 
corresponding Forms in Plato‟s ontology.  There are Forms which are mentioned occasionally 
in Plato‟s works but whose status remains obscure.  These can be divided into three 
categories.  First, there are properties which are not as mundane as the objects listed in the 
Parmenides but which are (unlike goodness, justice or beauty) value-neutral; for example, 
properties such as largeness and smallness.36  Secondly, Plato mentions Forms of some 
mathematical properties, such as the Odd and the Even, and the Equal and the Unequal.37  
Finally, there are allusions in a few dialogues to Forms of artefacts, like tables.38   
 
Although these last three kinds of properties are explicitly referred to in Plato‟s works, it 
would be too hasty to assume that he must believe that there are Forms corresponding to 
such properties.  This is because such Forms (more accurately, potential Forms) are never 
discussed with the detail and frequency of Forms of moral and aesthetic values.  The amount 
of attention Plato devotes to value-laden Forms at least suggests that these feature 
consistently in his ontology, whereas the comparatively scant attention paid to value-neutral 
Forms makes their status uncertain.  Interpreters of Plato are divided over the exact range of 
Forms and there is particular controversy regarding whether there are Platonic Forms of 
artefacts or not.39 
 
Plato‟s failure to specify clearly which Forms exist, and which do not, creates problems for his 
metaphysical system.  It constitutes a gap in his metaphysics which makes the theory 
deficient.  More importantly, the absence of an explanation of why some Forms exist, while 
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others do not, means that Plato has not provided a principled reason to accept that there are 
those Forms to which he devotes the most attention – the Forms of the Just, the Beautiful, 
and the Good.  In other words, it is not clear why we should accept that these Forms exist 
when Plato has not explained why there are Forms of these properties but not of others. 
 
In response to this objection, it could be argued that the “compresence of opposites” 
argument, discussed in the previous section, could be used to provide an account of which 
Forms exist and which do not.  Thus, one could claim that there are only Forms of those 
properties which can simultaneously co-occur in a single particular (for example, largeness 
and smallness).  This would provide a systematic means of distinguishing between the 
properties which have corresponding Forms and which do not.  It is important to note that 
the use of the “compresence of opposites” argument in such an account is different from that 
discussed in the previous section.  When I dealt with this argument earlier, I was considering 
it as an argument for the existence of Forms; in this context, however, it would be used as a 
justification for restricting the scope of Forms in a certain way. 
 
Although this sort of appeal to the “compresence of opposites” argument would supply a 
principled reason to recognise only certain Forms, there are some problems with this 
account.  First, it requires the prior presupposition that at least some Forms exist, because, as 
I argued earlier, the “compresence of opposites” cannot, by itself, establish this.  Secondly, 
restricting the range of Forms in the way implied by this account overlooks explicit references 
in Plato‟s works to Forms of properties which are not susceptible to the “compresence of 
opposites”.  These include, for example, references to Forms of artefacts and Forms of 
mathematical properties such as the Odd and the Even.  I did say earlier that it is not entirely 
clear whether Plato really does acknowledge these Forms or not; however, if the 
“compresence of opposites” argument is to be used as a means of determining the range of 












The final problem with this account is that it is too speculative.  Plato does make reference to 
the phenomenon of the “compresence of opposites” in motivating the postulation of Forms, 
but he does not connect this idea to the question of which properties have corresponding 
Forms and which do not.  Therefore, the use of this argument as a means of determining the 
range of Platonic Forms is unpromising and does not seem to fit well with Plato‟s own views. 
 
The second of the three objections to the Forms which I shall consider is that Plato does not 
adequately explain the nature of the relationship between Forms and particulars.  Earlier in 
this chapter, I suggested that it seems more appropriate to assume that Plato conceives of 
Forms as paradigms rather than as universals, but I also drew attention to the tentativeness 
of this assumption because Plato‟s various discussions of Forms leave their precise nature 
and their relations to particulars inadequately determined.  The fact that Form-particular 
relations remain obscure is a considerable deficiency in Plato‟s metaphysical theory.  If the 
theory of Forms is to fulfil its various roles (some of which I outlined earlier), the account of 
such relations is crucial, yet the sketchy explanations which emerge from Plato‟s works are 
not adequate. 
 
In Plato‟s defence, it should perhaps be noted that he does give at least some indication that 
he is aware of this shortcoming (and others) of the theory of Forms.  This is illustrated in the 
Parmenides, which is of particular interest in the present context because it is devoted 
entirely to Platonic metaphysics and because it raises questions which suggest a critical self-
assessment of Forms on Plato‟s part.  One of the issues raised in this dialogue is the question 
about how Forms and particulars are related.  Parmenides, questioning a young Socrates, 
asks in what sense things in the perceptible world “share in” Forms: “So does each thing that 
gets a share get as its share the Form as a whole or a part of it?”40  In other words, does a 
Form occur in corresponding particulars in its entirety, or only partially?  This question 
places Socrates in a dilemma because both options are problematic.  If Forms are wholly 
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present in particulars, this implies that “it [a Form] will be at the same time, as a whole, in 
things that are many and separate; and thus it would be separate from itself”.41  However, if a 
Form is only partially present in each corresponding particular, this would imply that Forms 
are divisible.42 
 
Parmenides‟ question here does not exhaust all the possibilities of how particulars might 
“share in” Forms.  In posing the above dilemma regarding this relationship of “sharing”, he 
presupposes a spatial analogue which may not be appropriate, given that Forms are not 
spatial entities.  There may be a sense of “sharing” which avoids Parmenides‟ dilemma.43  
However, in this discussion Plato leaves this issue unresolved and, consequently, no 
definitive conclusion about Form-particular relations is reached.  The inconclusive nature of 
the Parmenides may well be the result of Plato‟s own uncertainty about how to resolve the 
puzzle of how Forms are connected to their corresponding particulars. 
 
Of course, this discussion of particulars‟ “sharing in” Forms leaves out the interpretation I 
provisionally endorsed earlier, namely, that the relationship between Forms and particulars 
is one of imitation or resemblance.  If particulars “imitate” Forms rather than “sharing in” 
them, then there is no puzzle about whether Forms are wholly or partially present in 
particulars, because this view explicitly denies that Forms are present in particulars at all 
(wholly or partially).  This conception of Forms avoids Parmenides‟ dilemma altogether, but 
two problems still remain.  First, as I have already stressed, although it does seem that Plato 
endorses this alternative, he does not do so consistently, and his commitment to this 
conception of Forms is thus uncertain.  Secondly, even if Form-particular relations are 
understood in terms of imitation rather than instantiation, the theory is still vulnerable to the 
problem of self-predication and the resulting “Third Man” argument.  This is the final 
criticism of the theory of Forms which I shall consider in this chapter. 
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“Self-predication” refers to the phenomenon of Forms themselves having the properties 
which they confer on sensible particulars.  Thus, for example, the Form of the Large is itself 
large, the Form of the Beautiful is itself beautiful, and so on.  That Forms be self-predicative 
in this way seems necessary for them to fulfil their roles as paradigms which are imitated by 
particulars – for how could something serve as the paradigm of a property if it did not itself 
have that property?  The self-predicative nature of Forms is also asserted explicitly in the 
Parmenides.44 
 
The self-predication of Forms creates two problems for the theory.  The first is that the idea 
of self-predication, when applied to Forms, is undesirably obscure.  In what sense, for 
example, is the Form of the Beautiful itself beautiful?  Given the fundamental difference 
between concrete particulars and abstract Forms, it seems odd to think that both could be 
beautiful in exactly the same sense.  Self-predication may be interpreted in such a way that 
the terms designating properties are not applicable to Forms and particulars in the same way, 
but it is not clear how this could be formulated plausibly.  For instance, to say that the Form 
of the Beautiful is self-predicative in the sense that it is the property of being beautiful would 
yield an unilluminating tautology.  Alternatively, to claim that the Form of the Beautiful is 
beautiful in some sense which is entirely distinct from the sense in which particulars are 
beautiful would create too great a difference between Forms and particulars for the former to 
serve as paradigms of the latter.  It could also be argued that Forms are self-predicative in the 
sense that they “participate in” themselves, just as sensible particulars “participate in” Forms.  
But the notion of a Form‟s participating in itself seems even more mysterious than the notion 
of a particular‟s participating in a Form. 
 
The second, and probably more serious problem, associated with the self-predication of 
Forms is the so-called “Third Man” argument.  This argument is made by Plato‟s critics, 
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including Aristotle, but Plato himself also raises it in the Parmenides.45    The argument 
proceeds from the claim that Forms are self-predicative.  In Plato‟s metaphysical system, 
sensible particulars have their properties in virtue of their relations to the Forms of those 
properties.  But if Forms themselves have their own properties (which is what self-
predication means), then, by analogous reasoning, there must be something in virtue of 
which they possess these properties.  For example, since the Form of Largeness itself has the 
property of being large, this must be because it is related to some additional entity which 
confers the property largeness on the Form.  The problem is that this generates an infinite 
regress of Forms: particulars are large because of their relation to the Form Largeness, the 
Form of Largeness is itself large because of its relation to a further Form of Largeness, and so 
on.  This regress could be avoided if the Form of Largeness were large in virtue of its relation 
to itself – rather than its relation to a further Form – but this would be a problematic move.  
As I have already suggested, the notion of a Form‟s “participating in” itself is obscure.  
Alternatively, if the relationship between Forms and particulars is understood in terms of 
imitation, then it does not seem to make sense to say that the Form of Largeness is large in 
virtue of its relation to itself.  This would involve saying that the Form of Largeness is large 
because it imitates itself, which is not very intelligible. 
 
The “Third Man” appears to present a substantial challenge to Plato‟s theory of Forms.  If this 
argument is sound, Plato‟s characterisation of Forms seems to compel him to admit an 
infinite number of Forms into his ontology, and this is surely undesirable.  As I mentioned at 
the end of the previous section, postulating mysterious entities like Forms is problematic – 
how much worse it would then be to postulate an infinity of such entities.  The regress of 
Forms implied by the “Third Man” argument also strips the theory of Forms of the 
explanatory force it could have.  On the assumption that there is a single Form corresponding 
to every property, the theory of Forms provides an elegant account of properties; but to 
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explain the properties of particulars in terms of their relations to an infinite series of Forms is 
not very plausible. 
 
Plato‟s theory of Forms could be rescued from the “Third Man” argument if the notion of self-
predication could be defined in a suitable way.  Such a definition would somehow need to 
preserve the parity between the properties of particulars and those of Forms so that Forms 
could still serve as paradigms of these properties.  At the same time, it would need to be 
shown how this parity does not cause the self-predicative nature of Forms to lead to an 
infinite regress of Forms.  As I have already pointed out, the prospects for formulating such a 




I shall conclude this chapter with a brief recapitulation of what I have covered.  First, I 
considered what kinds of entities Forms are and how they are related to particulars.  I argued 
that the evidence in Plato‟s works suggests that he generally considers Forms to be paradigms 
of which sensible particulars are imitations, but that there are also suggestions in his texts 
that Forms are to be understood as “immanent” in their corresponding particulars.  Secondly, 
I briefly sketched some of the roles that Forms play in Plato‟s philosophy, not only in 
metaphysics but also in epistemology, ethics and political philosophy.  Thirdly, I discussed 
some possible motivations for postulating Forms, and I argued that none of these succeeds in 
establishing that Platonic Forms exist.  Finally, I raised some criticisms of the theory of 
Forms, including some gaps and inconsistencies which remain in the theory as well as the 
problem of self-predication and the resulting “Third Man” argument. 
 
The expository portion of this chapter provides the background for the discussion of Chapter 












critical portion of the chapter highlights evaluative points which will have a crucial influence 
on that analysis.  The inadequacy of the arguments for Forms, and the force of the objections 
to the theory, will undoubtedly affect the assessment of the convergence between Plato‟s 















In this chapter I discuss the second central theme of this dissertation – Plato‟s moral theory.  
Ethics is very prominent in Plato‟s writings, as moral issues arise with great frequency and 
some dialogues are devoted entirely to particular moral concepts or questions.  In 
comparison to his metaphysical theory, which I outlined in the previous chapter, Plato‟s 
ethics is, in some respects, more accessible and comprehensible because the central themes 
recur more explicitly and there is a higher degree of consistency among Plato‟s various 
comments on moral questions.  However, his ethical position is nonetheless complex and 
contains important subtleties which need to be elucidated.  Consequently, it is not possible to 
provide a concise summary statement of Plato‟s moral theory; understanding his ethics 
requires an investigation of several issues which, in combination, make up a nuanced 
position. 
 
In contrast to most contemporary moral theories, which typically attempt to provide 
universally applicable principles dictating how people ought to act, Plato‟s ethics is 
concerned primarily with the sort of character one ought to have and the sort of life one 
ought to live.  Thus, rather than focusing on how we should judge the rightness or wrongness 
of individual actions, the questions addressed in Plato‟s dialogues revolve around the 
qualities of a good character and the features of a worthwhile human life. 
 
My goals in this chapter are to elucidate and evaluate Plato‟s moral theory by investigating 
how he answers these two questions.  I shall, therefore, consider his views on good character, 
his views on the good life, and the connections between the two.  First, I will outline Plato‟s 
idea of good character and his conception of virtue.  I shall then examine how he understands 












happiness and the good life.  This will complete the foundations required for the analysis in 
Chapter IV. 
 
A. Traits of Good Character 
 
Perhaps the simplest question to clarify concerning Plato‟s ethics is which character traits he 
considers to be good ones – or, in other words, what qualities he thinks are virtues.  As will be 
evident in the forthcoming discussion of Plato‟s ethics, the notion of virtue occupies a central 
role in his moral theory.  There are four character traits which Plato clearly and undeniably 
takes to be virtues: wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice.  A fifth virtue, piety, is the 
subject of discussion in the Euthyphro, but, considering the relative scarcity of references to 
this virtue in other dialogues, it does not seem that Plato attaches too much significance to 
this quality as a virtue.  Hence, it can be assumed that it is the other four virtues which Plato 
considers to be the central components of moral character. 
 
That Plato considers wisdom to be a virtue is incontestable given the emphasis he 
consistently places on this characteristic in his dialogues.  It is evident that he believes that 
the person whose life is directed by wisdom (or knowledge, or understanding) is a virtuous 
person.  The other three virtues –  justice, courage, and temperance – are brought up in 
various places in Plato‟s texts, but they have whole dialogues devoted to them as well.  
Courage is discussed in the Laches, temperance in the Charmides, and justice in the Republic 
and the Gorgias. 
 
Plato‟s vision of what constitutes good character is summarised in his depiction of the “just 
individual” in the Republic.  This individual exemplifies the four virtues listed above and, 
although Plato describes him specifically as the ideally just person, his portrayal of this 












Republic possesses the first virtue, wisdom, because it is the rational part of his soul which 
governs his life.  He is courageous because the “spirited” component of his soul functions 
appropriately and is controlled by reason, so that he is neither cowardly nor brash or 
obsessed with honour.  The just person is also temperate because his appetites are 
constrained by reason.  Finally, he is just because his soul is appropriately ordered so that 
each component performs its proper function in harmony with the rest – this is Plato‟s 
account, in the Republic, of what it is for an individual to be just.46 
 
It is clear, then, that the character traits Plato counts as virtues include wisdom, courage, 
temperance, and justice.  The next issue which needs to be addressed is the deeper and more 
interesting question: what is it that makes traits like these virtues?  Or, in other words, what 
is the definition of virtue generally?  Plato addresses this question in his dialogues, in 
addition to discussing particular virtues.  From these various discussions two important 
aspects of the general nature of virtue emerge.  I shall discuss these in the next section. 
 
B. The Nature of Virtue 
 
The first component of Plato‟s conception of virtue is the view that there is a relationship 
between virtue and knowledge.  The notion that there is a connection between virtue and 
knowledge (or wisdom) recurs in several of Plato‟s dialogues.  It might be too strong to claim 
that Plato identifies virtue with knowledge, but I would argue that, at the very least, he does 
perceive a link between the two.  The idea that virtue is a kind of knowledge is discussed at 
some length in the Meno and the Protagoras.47  Both dialogues end somewhat 
inconclusively, but the fact that this idea is given significant attention suggests that Plato 
considers it to be worth taking seriously.  In addition, that Plato believes there is a connection 
between knowledge and virtue is suggested by his claim that those things which are 
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conventionally thought to be good (health, strength, wealth, beauty, and so on) are only good 
if they are used well – that is, with knowledge and wisdom.  It is virtue which facilitates the 
wise use of these things and thus makes them good; therefore, virtue must itself be a kind of 
knowledge or wisdom.48 
 
The second key element of Plato‟s general conception of virtue is that it is related to personal 
benefit.  This means that a virtue is a character trait which it is beneficial for a person to have, 
so a virtuous person will be better off than a non-virtuous person.  Plato asserts the 
relationship between virtue and personal benefit in several places.  For example, in the Laws, 
the anonymous Athenian claims that the good person “enjoys good fortune and is happy”;49 
and in the Meno, Socrates and Meno agree that “virtue is something beneficial”.50  The 
connection between virtue and benefit is also assumed in the Republic, where Socrates 
argues that justice is a virtue because the just person is better off than the unjust person.51 
 
From this, Plato‟s conception of virtue can be summarised as follows: virtues are character 
traits which manifest knowledge or wisdom and which are beneficial for a person to have.  
These two aspects of virtue are not only readily compatible, but one can support the other – it 
could be argued that virtue is beneficial because someone whose actions are guided by 
knowledge is better off than someone who acts from ignorance.  The relationships between 
virtue and knowledge, and between virtue and benefit, as Plato construes them, are worth 
analysing in further depth.  I shall discuss the first of these relationships in connection with 
the subject of the next section, which is the Unity of Virtue.  Then, in the section after that, I 
shall consider the link between virtue and benefit in more detail by examining how Plato 
connects virtue and happiness. 
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C. The Unity of Virtue 
 
Another important aspect of Plato‟s view of good character is the way he relates individual 
virtues to one another.  Plato is commonly thought to endorse, or at least to be sympathetic 
to, the doctrine referred to as the “Unity of Virtue”.52  In the most general terms, the Unity of 
Virtue is the idea that virtue is a whole, of which the parts are particular virtues (courage, 
temperance, etc.).  There are different senses in which individual virtues might be said to 
constitute a “unity”, and so the Unity of Virtue doctrine can take various forms.  Here I shall 
discuss four versions of the Unity of Virtue principle which might be reflections of Plato‟s 
views on the relationships among virtues. 
 
The first version involves interpreting the Unity of Virtue quite literally as the idea that virtue 
is a whole of which particular virtues are its parts.  This is suggested by some of Plato‟s 
phrasing in discussions of virtue.53  However, even if he does sometimes appear to express 
the Unity of Virtue doctrine in these terms, it is very difficult to make sense of what this idea 
might mean.  It surely cannot be the case that, for example, courage is a component of virtue 
in the same sense in which a brick is a component of a wall.  The part-whole terminology 
might be intended to be taken less literally, as merely an analogy for the idea that the general 
term “virtue” covers the individual traits which are considered virtues, but this turns out to 
be entirely uninformative.  Consequently, a meaningful version of the Unity of Virtue 
doctrine requires a more substantial account of how individual virtues are connected.  The 
other three interpretations of the Unity of Virtue which I will discuss constitute such 
accounts. 
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The Unity of Virtue might be interpreted as the view that the individual virtues imply one 
another, such that a person cannot possess one of them without possessing them all.  This 
interpretation can itself be expressed as one of two distinct claims, one stronger than the 
other.  The stronger version is the claim that having one particular virtue necessarily implies 
that one has others.  Plato alludes to this idea in the Gorgias when Socrates says that the self-
controlled person will necessarily also be just, pious, and brave.54  The weaker version of this 
view is that, as a contingent matter of fact, individuals who have one virtue will have all of 
them.  Both of these forms of the Unity of Virtue principle would require considerable 
argument to make them plausible.  The stronger version would require an analysis of the 
nature of each virtue in question and some proof of their mutual entailment.  The weaker 
version would require an explanation of why people tend to have all the virtues together 
rather than in isolation. 
 
On the face of it, the prospects for adequately justifying the claim that the virtues imply one 
another does not look promising, even if this claim is taken in its weaker form.  However, the 
last version of the Unity of Virtue which I shall consider might be able to provide some 
account of why the virtues occur all together. 
 
The third possible interpretation of the Unity of Virtue doctrine in Plato‟s moral theory is that 
justice is a “global” virtue which unifies the other virtues (courage, wisdom, and 
temperance).55  This view is clearly based on the depiction of the “just individual” in the 
Republic.  As Plato describes him, this person is wise, courageous and temperate because 
each of the relevant parts of his soul performs its function well; justice is this overall order 
and harmony in the soul, and this is the sense in which it “unifies” the virtues. 
 
Although this version of the Unity of Virtue principle fits very well with the account of justice 
Plato gives in the Republic, it seems not to adequately capture Plato‟s general conception of 
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virtue and is also a little dubious in itself.  This view of justice as the “unifying” virtue is not 
raised outside the Republic.  Although this dialogue is one of Plato‟s longest and most famous 
works, that he does not discuss this idea elsewhere makes it seem inappropriate to assume 
that he consistently endorses the Unity of Virtue principle in this form.  In addition, the 
definition of “justice” in the individual which Plato gives in the Republic is unique to that 
dialogue and is quite different from commonsense understandings of justice.  Moreover, it is 
rather unilluminating to claim that justice creates a unity among the virtues if justice itself is 
defined as a certain arrangement of the soul which already involves the possession of other 
virtues. 
 
The final version of the Unity of Virtue principle which I shall consider seems to be the most 
plausible, both in itself and in relation to the rest of Plato‟s moral theory.  It is the view that 
what unifies the individual virtues is knowledge or wisdom.56  This interpretation is 
somewhat similar to the previous one, in the sense that it also singles out one quality as the 
“global” virtue which unifies the others, but, in this case, the “global” virtue is wisdom rather 
than justice.  Thus, according to this view, the virtues form a unity because they all originate 
from, or are manifestations of, this global wisdom. 
 
There are several reasons why I consider this interpretation of the Unity of Virtue to be more 
plausible than the others.  First, as I argued in the previous section, one feature of Plato‟s 
general conception of virtue is that there is a relationship between virtue and knowledge.  
There is an obvious parallel between this idea and the view that the virtues form a unity 
because they stem from, or are connected to, a global wisdom.  Secondly, this version of the 
Unity of Virtue doctrine is richer and more informative than the others.  Thirdly, this view is 
not only compatible with the first two interpretations of the Unity of Virtue but can also be 
used as a means of filling them out.  The first interpretation I mentioned was simply the idea 
that individual virtues are components of virtue as a whole.  If the unity of the virtues 
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consists in their relation to a global wisdom, it is possible to make some sense of the notion of 
the virtues being parts of a greater whole by understanding each individual virtue as a 
particular instance of this wisdom which is the “whole” of virtue.  The second interpretation 
of the Unity of Virtue doctrine I discussed was the view that virtues imply one another.  
Again, the view that knowledge is what creates unity among the virtues can explain why 
virtues would imply one another: if each virtue stems from a global wisdom, then one cannot 
have one virtue without having them all.  A person who has this wisdom will necessarily have 
the virtues which it entails, while a person who lacks this wisdom will not have these virtues. 
 
Even though I have been arguing that the idea that the virtues are unified by wisdom is the 
most plausible of the four interpretations of the Unity of Virtue I have considered, there may 
well be grounds on which to object to this view.  For example, it could be objected that this 
version of the Unity of Virtue principle appears to assume that wisdom, and thus virtue, is an 
all-or-nothing matter, but, intuitively at least, it seems that there could be different kinds and 
degrees of both wisdom and virtue.  It certainly appears plausible that a person could be, say, 
both courageous and immoderate, or wise in certain areas of life but not others.  To deal with 
such questions it would be necessary to analyse in further depth how exactly Plato construes 
“knowledge” or “wisdom” in the relevant contexts, but such an analysis is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation. 
 
What matters more for my present purposes is the conclusion which can be drawn from this 
examination of the Unity of Virtue doctrine and how it relates to Plato‟s ethics.  In the light of 
what I have discussed in this section and the previous one, it can be concluded that in Plato‟s 
moral theory, there is clearly a connection between virtue and knowledge.  I suggested in the 
previous section that there are several ways in which Plato draws such a connection in his 
dialogues, and in this section I have argued that, if he does endorse the Unity of Virtue 
principle, it is most likely that he views wisdom (or knowledge) as the factor which brings 












conception of virtue and hence his ethics.  This point will be of importance in the analysis I 
shall conduct in Chapter IV, when I consider how the theory of Forms might feature in the 
knowledge which Plato connects to virtue.57 
 
D. Virtue and Happiness 
 
I shall now turn to the other key feature of Plato‟s conception of virtue mentioned earlier, 
namely, that virtue is beneficial.  As I have already indicated, Plato‟s view is that a virtuous 
person is better off than a person who lacks virtue.  In this section, I shall examine this issue 
in further depth by considering how Plato might construe the connection between virtue and 
happiness.58  This is an important component of my analysis partly because it helps to shed 
further light on Plato‟s notion of virtue, but also because it brings out the relationship 
between the good character and the worthwhile life.  At the beginning of this chapter, I 
suggested that Plato‟s ethics is concerned with two general questions: what sort of person one 
ought to be and what sort of life one ought to live.  So far I have been dealing with the first 
question; in this section, I shall examine the connection between the two; and, in the next 
section, I shall discuss the second question. 
 
It is clear that Plato assumes that happiness is intrinsically valuable and thus something for 
which any rational person would aim.  Two examples of where he makes this assumption 
explicit are in the Euthydemus and the Symposium.  In the Euthydemus, Socrates asks, “Do 
all men wish to do well?” but declares, without waiting for an answer, that the question is a 
stupid one because the answer is so obvious.59  Similarly, in the Symposium, it is suggested 
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that it is not necessary to ask why anyone would desire happiness,60 which indicates that the 
intrinsic value of happiness is taken for granted.  In the light of such claims about the value of 
happiness, it is evident that this is an important component of Plato‟s moral philosophy. 
 
The claim that virtue is beneficial warrants further analysis because the (purported) 
connection between virtue and happiness is not immediately obvious.  Moreover, it is 
possible to conceive of situations in which it seems that being virtuous would not lead to 
happiness but rather the opposite.  For example, someone who behaves justly in a highly 
corrupt society is not likely to be happy or flourish; in such a situation, virtue would seem to 
be detrimental to one‟s happiness rather than conducive to it. 
 
There are two ways of responding to such (apparent) counter-examples to the claim that 
virtue is beneficial.  The first is to hold that any character trait which causes a person to do 
well is, by definition, a virtue, even if the trait in question is not ordinarily considered a 
virtue.  Thus, to return to the example above, if a person would flourish in a corrupt society 
by behaving unjustly, then injustice would be a virtue.  Plato considers this way of preserving 
the link between virtue and benefit in the Republic when Thrasymachus challenges Socrates 
with the argument that injustice is a virtue and justice is a vice, because the unjust person 
fares better than the just person.61  However, this is not Plato‟s own view – he certainly does 
not claim that injustice, cowardice, intemperance, and so on, are virtues in certain 
circumstances.  Instead, he takes the second and more challenging route, by maintaining that 
the qualities ordinarily considered virtues really are beneficial to the person who has them. 
 
Although it is quite clear that this is Plato‟s position, the details of how he construes the 
relationship between virtue and happiness are somewhat less clear.  One important issue 
which is difficult to resolve is whether Plato considers virtue to be only necessary for 
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happiness, or whether he thinks that virtue is both necessary and sufficient for happiness.62  
If virtue is necessary but not sufficient for happiness, this means that one must be virtuous in 
order to do well in life, but other factors may also be required for one to be happy (such as 
favourable circumstances).  In contrast, the view that virtue is also sufficient for happiness 
means that a virtuous person will be happy regardless of the kinds of circumstances in which 
she lives. 
 
It is not clear which of these is the more accurate reflection of Plato‟s position, because in his 
writings he makes remarks which allude to both alternatives.  The view that virtue is 
necessary for happiness is justified by the claim, to which I referred earlier in this chapter, 
that “conventional” goods such as health, wealth, strength, beauty, and so on, are only made 
good when they are used properly – that is, with virtue.  Therefore, virtue is necessary for 
happiness because such things cannot make a person‟s life better unless she uses them 
virtuously. 
 
However, some of the comments Plato makes in his dialogues suggest that he believes that 
virtue is not only necessary but also sufficient for happiness.  One example of this can be 
found in the Laws, when the Athenian says that a virtuous person will be happy irrespective 
of whether he is weak or powerful, or rich or poor.63  Thus, even if a person lacks 
“conventional” goods like health, power, wealth, and so on, he will be happy if he is virtuous.  
A further suggestion of the view that virtue is sufficient for happiness can be found in the 
Gorgias, where it is said that the good man “does well and admirably whatever he does, 
while the corrupt man, the one who does badly, is miserable”.64 
 
The view that virtue is not only necessary but also sufficient for happiness is too strong a 
claim to have any immediate plausibility.  One can easily imagine a virtuous person who lives 
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in wretched circumstances and question how his virtue alone suffices to make him happy.  It 
could be shown that such a person is happy if “happiness” were given some “moralised” 
definition, such that it is restricted to being morally well-off; in this sense, the virtuous 
person in terrible circumstances is “happy” because he has a moral character.  However, this 
creates a circularity because virtue is being understood in terms of personal benefit, but this 
benefit is itself being defined in terms of virtue.  As I argued earlier in this chapter, Plato 
conceives of virtues as character traits which are beneficial to have and which promote the 
individual‟s happiness.  If “benefit” and “happiness” are to be understood in a “moralised” 
way, this would mean that what constitutes a benefit, or happiness, is having a certain moral 
character.  This makes the definitions of virtue and benefit circular: a virtue is a trait which 
benefits its possessor, but to be benefited is to be virtuous.  As a result, the accounts of 
“virtue” and “benefit” become unilluminating.  However, if one adopts a commonsense (non-
moralised) understanding of happiness or benefit, it seems patently false that virtue alone is 
sufficient for happiness. 
 
The idea that virtue is merely necessary for happiness is the weaker and therefore more 
plausible claim.  Plato‟s argument that things like health, power, wealth, and so on, are good 
only when used wisely and virtuously, is not objectionable.  However, this justification for the 
claim that virtue is necessary for happiness has a consequence which could be objectionable.  
The consequence is that “goods” like health, power and wealth become harmful if they are 
used with vice rather than virtue.65  This is because the argument is based on the idea that 
such things are neutral – neither good nor bad – in themselves but only become good or bad 
depending on the character employing them.  Therefore, if they are used by a virtuous person 
they will benefit her, whereas if they are used by a vicious person they will harm her.  Plato 
embraces this implication quite happily,66 but for many it would surely be very counter-
intuitive.  For example, it is difficult to understand in what sense health is “harmful” to a 
tyrant.  Of course, health may be morally harmful to him because it enables him to commit 
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more tyranny than if he were unhealthy; but again, if harm and benefit are being understood 
in a “moralised” way then there is a circularity between virtue and benefit.  Thus, the 
argument that virtue is necessary for happiness, because it enables conventional goods to 
benefit the virtuous person, is not wholly plausible, since it either leads to a very counter-
intuitive implication or requires a moralised definition of “benefit” which yields a circularity. 
 
Although it is not altogether clear whether Plato considers virtue to be (merely) necessary or 
(also) sufficient for happiness, what is clear is that he does perceive some relationship 
between virtue and happiness, and that virtue is an important component of his vision of the 
ideal human life.  This issue is given sustained attention in the Republic when Socrates 
provides a defence of justice to refute Thrasymachus‟ objection that injustice is more 
beneficial than justice.  In this defence, Plato does not clearly commit himself to the view that 
virtue is sufficient (rather than merely necessary) for happiness, but seems here to be more 
concerned to show only that the virtuous person is better off in comparison to the unvirtuous 
person.  Because this is one of the most detailed of Plato‟s arguments dealing with the 
connection between virtue and happiness, it is worth considering in the present context.  
Even though the argument focuses only on justice and not on the virtues more generally, it is 
still very relevant to a broader examination of the connections between virtue and happiness.  
Justice is a virtue to which Plato attaches great importance, and if the defence of justice in the 
Republic is sound then he will have succeeded in demonstrating that one of the traits he 
considers to be a virtue really does benefit the person who possesses it.  Furthermore, as I 
mentioned earlier, Plato‟s depiction of the “just individual” in the Republic is a depiction of 
someone who is not merely “just” in the ordinary sense of the word but who exemplifies good 
character generally. 
The arguments for the connection between justice and happiness which Plato gives in the 
Republic are complex and the conclusion is reached circuitously because of numerous 
digressions into issues which do not bear directly on the main question.  In order to avoid 












Republic in detail, but instead I will extract a few of the central points which may help to shed 
further light on how Plato construes the relationship between virtue and happiness, and his 
conception of happiness.67 
 
One important justification Plato gives for the view that the just person is better off than the 
unjust person makes reference to the states of their respective souls.  As Plato describes him, 
the just person‟s soul is in a state of harmony, because each of its components (reason, spirit, 
and appetite) performs only its own function and does not interfere with the others.  Reason 
is the dominant element in the just soul and this is what maintains the harmony and ensures 
the proper functioning of the components of the soul.  In contrast, the soul of the unjust 
person fails to exhibit this kind of order and is in disarray.  Plato describes the soul of the just 
individual as “healthy” and that of the unjust individual as “unhealthy”.68  Given this 
portrayal of the contrast between the just and the unjust soul, it is obvious why the just 
person would be happier – someone whose body is diseased will be unhappy in comparison 
to someone whose body is healthy, so if the just individual is the paradigm of the “healthy” 
soul, he will clearly be happier than someone with an “unhealthy” soul. 
 
That the just person is ruled by the rational part of his soul also gives him an advantage in 
terms of happiness.  Because his life is governed by reason, he is better able to recognise and 
pursue what is truly valuable and rationally best for himself.  Plato brings out this point 
further by contrasting the life of the just person with those of the “unjust” individuals who 
correspond to the political regimes he considers to fall short of the ideally just state.  He 
discusses the timocratic, oligarchic, democratic and tyrannical individuals and claims that 
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they are all unhappy because, unlike the just individual, reason is not the governing element 
in their souls.69 
 
Another relevant aspect of Plato‟s argument that the life of the just person is better than the 
life of the unjust person can be drawn from his depiction of the philosophers who are to rule 
the hypothetical state described in the Republic.  The philosophers are to rule because they 
are the wisest people in the state, and they have souls which exhibit the order and harmony of 
Plato‟s ideally just individual; thus, they not only rule the city using their faculties of reason, 
but they also rule themselves according to reason because of the dominance of the rational 
element in their souls.  Plato also claims that these philosophers, in virtue of their superior 
rationality, are capable of enjoying pursuits not accessible to the masses.  The philosophers 
take pleasure in intellectual pursuits, in particular, the contemplation of Platonic Forms, and 
these pleasures are described as superior and “more real” than the mundane pleasures of the 
unenlightened majority.70  The implication of this is that the just person, whose soul is like 
those of Plato‟s philosophers, has a better life than an unjust person because he has access to 
pleasures and pursuits which are most valuable. 
 
The arguments I have discussed in this section may not appear adequately compelling to 
demonstrate that virtue is beneficial.  I have argued that the claim that virtue is sufficient for 
happiness is too strong to be plausible, whereas the idea that virtue is merely necessary for 
happiness is more credible but has a counter-intuitive implication.  The defence of justice in 
the Republic, which I have just discussed, is persuasive to the extent that one accepts Plato‟s 
account of the contrasting states of just and unjust souls.  However, it might well be objected 
that the arguments Plato gives in the Republic to support the benefits of justice still do not 
show that one will generally, or always, be better off behaving virtuously instead of viciously.  
To return to my earlier example, the arguments of the Republic do not seem to prove that a 
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person who lives in an extremely corrupt and unjust society will be better off behaving justly 
than unjustly. 
 
In response to such objections it should perhaps be pointed out that Plato‟s understanding of 
virtue is primarily concerned with character rather than with behaviour.  As his arguments 
for justice in the Republic indicate, he views virtue (in this case, justice) as an internal state 
rather than in terms of an agent‟s interactions with the external world.71  With this in mind, 
the objection that Plato has failed to show that a person will always be better off by acting 
virtuously seems misguided.  Plato‟s point is, rather, that virtue is beneficial in the sense that 
the virtuous person‟s soul is in a better state than the unvirtuous person‟s soul.  This does not 
entail that virtue is sufficient for happiness, but it does go some way towards explaining why 
Plato believes that virtue is a means to happiness. 
 
E. Plato’s Conception of Happiness 
 
The discussion of the connections between virtue and happiness which I gave in the previous 
section gives some indication of Plato‟s conception of the good life.  However, in this section, 
I shall briefly summarise the key points in order to provide a clearer and more explicit 
explanation of this conception. 
 
Plato evidently recognises the value of “conventional” goods like health, strength, wealth, and 
so on, but he also recognises their limitations as constituents of human happiness.  In other 
words, he acknowledges that such things have the potential to make a person‟s life better; 
however, he argues that they are not intrinsically good but only become good when they are 
used well.  These goods are therefore not essential for happiness, but may enhance it. 
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It is also clear that a crucial component of Plato‟s view of happiness and the good life is the 
exercise of reason, as he emphasises its importance in a variety of contexts.  This is indicated 
by the recurring theme that it is knowledge or wisdom which facilitates the proper use of 
“conventional” goods and makes them beneficial.  It is also expressed in the idea, which 
emerges from Plato‟s works quite generally, that the rational person is able to identify and 
pursue what is truly valuable.  Moreover, what Plato considers to be “truly valuable” are 
precisely those pursuits which involve the use of reason.  This is why, in the Republic, he 
claims that the lives of just individuals, exemplified by the philosophers, are the best sorts of 
lives – not only are their lives directed by reason, but they are also devoted to rational 
pursuits. 
 
Finally, Plato acknowledges the value of pleasure and its influence on happiness, but he does 
not consider pleasure to be the ultimate value or the sole determinant of the good life.  This is 
shown by the way he carefully distinguishes between the “better” and “worse” pleasures.72  
Unsurprisingly, the pleasures he ranks most highly are those associated with intellectual 




Plato‟s moral theory consists of two main elements: the notion of virtue and the value of 
happiness.  As I have demonstrated, these two issues are deeply connected in Plato‟s ethics.  I 
have argued that the principal features of Plato‟s conception of virtue are, first, that virtue is 
connected to some kind of wisdom or knowledge, and, secondly, that virtue is beneficial to 
the person who possesses it.  The latter of these two features is the point at which Plato‟s view 
of moral character converges with his conception of happiness.  Plato‟s understanding of 
happiness – or what constitutes a good life – strongly emphasises the role of reason, both as 
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a means of choosing which ends to pursue and as something which confers value on certain 
ends. 
 
Throughout my examination of Plato‟s ethics, I have pointed out aspects of his moral theory 
which are potentially problematic or which require further development or clarification.  For 
instance, as I discussed in the section on the Unity of Virtue, it is not clear how Plato 
conceives of the relationships among the qualities that he classifies as virtues.  In addition, 
some of the details of how virtue and happiness are connected in Plato‟s ethics could be 
clarified and justified further.  Despite these deficiencies, Plato‟s many discussions of ethical 
issues provide, on the whole, a fairly unproblematic moral theory.  Certai ly, his ethics seems 
less problematic than the metaphysical theory of Forms.  Having laid the necessary 
groundwork in this chapter and the previous one, in the next chapter I shall turn to an 












IV. THE CONVERGENCE OF ETHICS AND METAPHYSICS 
 
In this chapter, I shall pursue the primary aim of this dissertation.  Drawing on what was 
covered in the previous two chapters, I shall analyse in what ways Plato‟s theory of Forms 
connects to his ethics.  Some of the links between the two themes are established quite 
explicitly in Plato‟s works, but others are suggested only implicitly and require more 
interpretation and analysis to draw them out.  Consequently, in my analysis I shall consider 
some fairly direct references in Plato‟s dialogues to the Forms‟ place in his ethics, but I shall 
also discuss some of the less explicit ways in which his ethics and metaphysics may be 
connected.  Where necessary, I shall indicate the degree to which the various connections I 
discuss are drawn explicitly or only implicitly by Plato. 
  
One of the most direct links between ethics and metaphysics which Plato establishes is in his 
discussion of the Form of the Good in the Republic.  The Form of the Good is clearly relevant 
to an analysis of the convergence between Plato‟s ethics and the theory of Forms, because this 
is one connection which Plato makes most clearly and explicitly.  For this reason, I devote 
some attention to this topic in the first section of this chapter.  However, my treatment of the 
Form of the Good is relatively brief.  Rather than embarking on a detailed discussion of the 
Republic‟s characterisation of the Form of the Good, I have focused on connections between 
Plato‟s moral and metaphysical theories which can be drawn from a greater range of his 
dialogues besides the Republic.  Thus, the bulk of my analysis is in the second and third 
sections of this chapter. 
 
Because of the nature of the dialogue form which Plato uses, as well as the variety of contexts 
in which he mentions Forms, the material on which I must base this analysis is fragmented 
and scattered.  As a result, the issues are difficult to untangle.  In the hope of imposing a 












of Forms in Plato‟s ethics into two broad categories, which I refer to as “metaphysical” and 
“epistemological” respectively.  The first of these focuses on how Forms can serve as a theory 
of moral properties, and the meta-ethical position to which Plato‟s characterisation of Forms 
commits him.  The second relates to the ways in which Forms feature, or might feature, in 
Plato‟s moral theory with respect to matters pertaining to knowledge.  As I made clear in 
Chapter III, knowledge and wisdom are significant themes in Plato‟s ethics, so it is 
appropriate to consider what place Forms might have in the relevant sort of knowledge.  After 
dealing with the Form of the Good in the first section of this chapter, I will discuss the 
metaphysical roles of the Forms in the second section and the epistemological roles in the 
third. 
 
A. The Form of the Good 
 
In most of Plato‟s dialogues which mention Forms, the Form of the Good is not given special 
attention, but is simply listed along with other Forms.  It is only in the Republic that this 
Form is examined in detail and presented as having a special status relative to the rest of the 
Forms.  In this section I shall provide a brief discussion of the Form of the Good as it is 
characterised in the Republic.  This includes an overview of what Plato says in this dialogue 
about the Form of the Good, as well as a summary of some of the main objections to his 
conception of this Form. 
 
The Form of the Good is introduced in the Republic at the point when Socrates and his 
interlocutors are considering the education of the Guardians who are to govern the ideal state 
they are describing.  Socrates claims that the Guardians must be educated in the “most 












dialogue.73  He then adds that there is an even more important subject than this, which turns 
out to be the Form of the Good.74 
 
In the discussion which follows, Plato gives the Form of the Good a kind of superiority over 
the rest of the Forms, presenting it as a “first principle” of sorts.  The Form of the Good, as it 
is described in the Republic, has a special priority – metaphysically, epistemically, and even 
morally.  It is a “first principle” in that it is the end-point of explanation in these areas.  In 
metaphysics, the Form of the Good is said to be the cause of the existence of the rest of the 
Forms;75 it is thus, in modern terminology, ontologically prior to other Forms.  
Epistemologically, the Form of the Good is also given particular significance.  Socrates claims 
that knowledge of the Form of the Good is necessary for knowledge of the other Forms,76 as 
well as for an understanding of why anything else is good.77  He also says that no knowledge 
of any subject will be beneficial unless one has prior knowledge of the Form of the Good.78  In 
ethics, the Form of the Good is important because it is the ultimate source of moral value.  
Socrates also claims that it is what makes the virtues “useful and beneficial”.79 
 
This depiction of the Form of the Good in the Republic is intriguing, because it has a certain 
appeal but also leaves questions unanswered.  As I mentioned in Chapter I, Plato‟s Form of 
the Good has been the subject of much discussion among his commentators.  I shall now 
briefly list a few of the main problems with the Form of the Good which have been identified. 
 
First, Plato never gives a definition or account of what exactly the Form of the Good is.  In the 
Republic, when Socrates is pressed to give his opinion of what “the Good” is, he refuses to do 
so, and instead goes on to illustrate the metaphysical and epistemological roles of the Form of 
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the Good using the analogy of the Sun.80  Given that the Form of the Good is such a highly 
abstract principle, it is understandable that Plato is hesitant to give a definition of it.  His 
failure to do so may not necessarily be objectionable, but if the Form of the Good is to serve 
as a “first principle”, which accounts for all knowledge and explanation, then it seems 
undesirable for it to remain so mysterious. 
 
Secondly, it is not clear how one is to know the Form of the Good, or even whether such 
knowledge is possible.  At one point in the Republic, Socrates uses the analogy of the Divided 
Line to represent different levels of cognition, and seems to suggest that, to attain knowledge 
of the Good, one must progress through these levels “by hypotheses” u til one reaches the 
“unhypothetical first principle of everything”.81  Although this gives some indication of how 
one might come to know the Form of the Good, the explanation is rather obscure and leaves 
the details of this process undetermined.  The difficulty of how we are to know the Form of 
the Good is problematic because of the epistemological priority it is given in the Republic.  As 
I explained earlier, knowledge of the Form of the Good is said to be necessary for knowledge 
of the other Forms, for knowledge of why anything is good, and for any other knowledge to be 
beneficial.  Thus, if it is not clear how (or whether) one is able to achieve knowledge of the 
Form of the Good, this makes it a problematic principle for epistemology. 
 
The final two objections I shall discuss are both raised by Aristotle.  The first is that the Form 
of the Good does not seem to have a place in ethics.  This is because, Aristotle argues, the 
Form of the Good is “not the sort of good a human being can pursue in action or possess”.82  
In other words, the Form of the Good is so abstract and distant from practical values that it is 
not the sort of thing for which people can actually aim.  The second of Aristotle‟s objections is 
that it is not appropriate to postulate just one “Form of the Good”, because there are in fact 
many different ways in which we speak of what is good.  Aristotle claims that there are 
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different versions of “the good” for different “categories”83 of things.  For example, some 
things are morally good (such as justice), while others are aesthetically good (i.e. beautiful), 
and some things are good because they perform their functions well (such as human 
artefacts).  Given these different senses of “good”, it is not clear why there should only be one 
Form of the Good. 
 
This survey of the Form of the Good is brief, but I hope that it has highlighted the main 
features of and problems with this Form.  The Form of the Good is an important and 
interesting topic in Plato‟s philosophy, and it does represent one point at which his ethics and 
metaphysics converge quite explicitly.  This is why I have covered it in this chapter.  However, 
I have refrained from discussing it in more depth because doing so would cause me to stray 
too far from the main focus of this dissertation, which is the analysis of ethics and the theory 
of Forms as global themes in Plato‟s philosophy.  The conception of the Form of the Good, 
which I have discussed here, is unique to the Republic and thus does not seem to be 
representative of the most general convergence of Platonic ethics and metaphysics.  I have, 
therefore, given greater priority to other, broader, interactions between these themes.  These 
interactions are the subjects of the next two sections of this chapter. 
 
B. The Metaphysical Roles of the Forms 
 
The Forms to which Plato devotes the most attention in his dialogues are the Forms of value-
laden properties, particularly the Form of the Good, the Form of the Just, and the Form of 
the Beautiful.  As I demonstrated in Chapter II, these are the only Forms which can almost 
certainly be said to be admitted into Plato‟s ontology, since the status of other potential 
Forms is less apparent.  In this section, I intend to consider what Plato‟s recognition of these 
Forms might imply about the place of Forms in his ethics. 
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I shall begin by showing how the Forms can be interpreted as a theory of moral properties 
and how the deficiencies in the theory of Forms discussed in Chapter II undermine this 
theory of moral properties.  Thereafter, I will discuss the meta-ethical position which 
emerges from Plato‟s theory of Forms when interpreted as a theory of moral properties.  To 
do this, I shall situate Plato‟s position in the landscape of contemporary meta-ethics by 
demonstrating how it can be classified as a variety of moral realism.  I will then assess Plato‟s 
version of moral realism, both on its own and in comparison to other varieties of realism.  I 
shall conclude that the weaknesses in the theory of Forms diminish its plausibility as a theory 
of moral properties and create problems for Platonic moral realism. 
 
Interpreting the Forms as a theory of moral properties involves applying the Forms as a 
general theory of properties to a particular subset of properties.  If Forms are construed as a 
theory of properties, this means that, according to this theory, particular items in the world 
have the properties they do in virtue of their relations to Forms of those properties.  When 
this is restricted to moral properties, the theory of Forms implies that particulars have moral 
properties because they are connected (in the relevant way) to Forms of those moral 
properties.  Thus, for example, a particular person or institution would be just (or would have 
the property “justice”) through having the required relation to the Form of the Just. 
 
The strengths and weaknesses of this theory of moral properties are much the same as those 
of the Forms as a general metaphysical system.  I discussed some objections to the theory of 
Forms in Chapter II and I now shall briefly recapitulate the main issues in order to highlight 
the principal challenges faced by the Forms as a theory of moral properties. 
 
The first problem is that Plato has not provided sufficient justifications for postulating 
Forms.  In Chapter II, I considered several arguments which have been given, or which could 
be given, to demonstrate that Platonic Forms exist, and I showed that none of these succeeds.  












supposed to explain how things in the world have moral qualities (such as moral goodness), 
but if the existence of the Forms of these qualities has not been satisfactorily established, 
then the theory cannot fulfil this function. 
 
The second problem is that Plato does not specify precisely which Forms exist and, more 
importantly, he does not give an account of how we are to distinguish between properties 
which have corresponding Forms and those which do not.  I have emphasised that Plato 
certainly does seem to believe that there are Forms of moral properties, and so it might be 
thought that his failure to explain whether other kinds of Forms exist is irrelevant to an 
assessment of the theory of Forms interpreted narrowly as a theory of moral properties.  
However, that Plato does not give a systematic account of which kinds of properties have 
corresponding Forms, and which do not, is problematic even when one focuses only on moral 
properties.  Such an account would provide a principled reason for postulating the Forms of 
the Good, the Beautiful, and the Just; but without such an account, there is no reason to 
accept that these Forms exist when we have not been told why there are these Forms but not 
others. 
 
These two objections both point to a broader problem with the Forms as a theory of moral 
properties, which is that the existence of Forms is doubtful.  As I argued in Chapter II, a 
metaphysical system which postulates entities as abstract and mysterious as Platonic Forms 
requires very compelling arguments to justify this postulation, but I have shown that such 
arguments are lacking in Plato‟s works.  Therefore, because it appeals to entities whose 
existence is dubious, the theory of Forms is not a strong account of moral properties. 
 
The third problem with Forms, which is relevant to the assessment of Plato‟s theory of moral 
properties, is that the nature of the relationship between Forms and particulars remains 
obscure.  Plato does not reach a clear enough conclusion regarding whether particulars 












things have moral properties is substantially diminished by the absence of a clear account of 
how something with a given moral property is related to the Form of that property. 
 
The final two weaknesses in the theory of Forms are the problems of self-predication and the 
“Third Man”.  That Forms are self-predicative is puzzling enough in general, but the obscurity 
seems especially acute in the case of moral properties.  We can make sense of the idea, for 
example, that a person, action or institution could be just, but in what sense could a purely 
abstract entity like a Platonic Form be “just”?  The “Third Man” argument, which 
demonstrates a potential infinite regress of Forms, similarly creates a problem for the theory 
of Forms as a theory of moral properties.  Without a plausible account of self-predication 
which enables the theory of Forms to escape the problem of the “Third Man” argument, these 
remain significant weaknesses in Plato‟s theory of moral properties. 
 
These objections to the theory of Forms, both individually and in combination, clearly show 
that Forms do not provide a promising foundation for a theory of moral properties.  
However, I shall, for the moment, set these difficulties aside, because there are connections 
between Plato‟s ethics and metaphysics which are worth examining despite the weaknesses in 
the theory of Forms.  In the remainder of this section, I will discuss the metaphysical roles of 
Forms in Plato‟s ethics further by considering the meta-ethical position to which Plato‟s 
characterisation of Forms commits him.  Because I will analyse this position as a variety of 
moral realism, I shall begin with an overview of this meta-ethical theory.  I will explain the 
most general features of moral realism and provide a short taxonomy of the relevant sub-
types of realism.  Against this background, I will demonstrate how Plato‟s position satisfies 
the general description of moral realism and how it compares to the other varieties of moral 
realism.  Lastly, I will evaluate Plato‟s particular version of moral realism. 
 
Moral realism is a tradition in meta-ethics which represents a broad view of the status of 












comprises the following three claims.84  First, moral statements are the sorts of propositions 
which are capable of being true or false.  Moral claims are like ordinary declarative 
statements in the sense that they purport to be factual (they have the form of reporting facts), 
and they are true or false depending on whether they report the facts accurately or not.  
Secondly, moral realism asserts that there are such things as moral facts.  The consequence of 
this is that some moral statements are actually true because they accurately report moral 
facts.  Finally, the truth of moral statements (or the nature of moral facts) is “objective” in the 
sense that their nature is independent of anyone‟s beliefs or opinions about them.85 
 
This description captures the essence of moral realism by characterising it broadly as a view 
which endorses the notion of moral truth and which considers this truth to be objective.  
However, this very general explanation clearly leaves out important details – most obviously, 
the concept of a “moral fact” requires illumination.  Ordinary facts expressed by declarative 
statements can be grasped easily enough, but the notion of a moral fact is far less clear.  A 
moral realist theory must, therefore, explain what constitutes the moral facts in virtue of 
which moral statements are true.  It would be too much of a digression for me to discuss all 
the possible varieties and sub-varieties of moral realism here; instead, I shall only focus on 
three main versions of moral realism which seem the most relevant to the study of Plato‟s 
meta-ethics. 
 
Within moral realism there is a broad division between two positions known as “naturalistic” 
and “non-naturalistic” moral realism respectively.  There is, in addition, “supernaturalistic” 
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moral realism, but this position is less widely discussed because of contemporary 
philosophy‟s general aversion to supernatural elements.  These different versions of moral 
realism provide competing accounts of what moral facts and moral properties are.  
Supernaturalistic moral realism identifies moral properties with supernatural properties.  So, 
for example, a supernaturalistic moral realist might hold that the property of being morally 
good is equivalent to the property of being willed by a divine being.  Naturalistic moral 
realism endorses the general principle of naturalism, which is the view that the only facts 
which exist are natural facts.  Therefore, naturalistic moral realism identifies moral 
properties with natural properties.  An example of a naturalistic moral realist theory is one 
which equates what is morally good with what is pleasant, so that the (moral) property 
“goodness” is identified with the (natural) property “pleasantness”.  Finally, non-naturalistic 
moral realism does not identify moral properties with any other kinds of properties.  Instead, 
it characterises moral properties as a class of their own, distinct from natural (or 
supernatural) properties.86 
 
Having thus clarified moral realism and some of its varieties, I shall now move on to 
discussing Plato‟s meta-ethical position.  That Plato is a moral realist may seem immediately 
obvious to some; however, instead of merely assuming this, I shall briefly demonstrate 
explicitly why his meta-ethics is consistent with the core principles of moral realism.  In 
addition, I shall explain the roles that Forms play in Plato‟s moral realism. 
 
In my initial exposition of moral realism, I suggested that it can be summarised in the 
following three claims: (i) that moral statements are capable of being true or false; (ii) that 
some moral statements are actually true; and (iii) that the truth of moral statements is 
objective (in the sense of “independent”).  Plato does not make any of these claims explicitly, 
since his theory of Forms pre-dates the classifications of modern meta-ethics.  However, it is 
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clear from the way in which he characterises Forms in his dialogues that he does endorse 
these broad principles of moral realism.  Consequently, as I shall now show, Plato‟s meta-
ethics satisfies the general criteria for moral realism. 
 
I shall begin with the second of the three claims: that some moral statements are actually 
true, because there are such things as moral facts and some moral statements accurately 
represent these facts.  That Plato‟s views are consistent with this principle of moral realism 
can be inferred from his belief that Forms exist and are the source of moral properties.  As 
should be evident from my discussions in Chapter II and the beginning of this section, it is 
reasonable to suppose that Plato believes that Forms exist and that there are Forms of moral 
properties (such as goodness and justice).  If there are such things as moral properties 
(Forms), and some items in the world actually have these properties (because they are related 
to the relevant Forms), then it follows that some statements about moral value – which 
ascribe moral properties to particular things – will be true.  Plato‟s meta-ethics therefore 
satisfies the second of the three principles of moral realism.  This also commits Plato to the 
first principle of moral realism, that moral statements are capable of being true, because it 
would be inconsistent to hold that some moral statements are actually true while denying 
that moral statements are capable of being true. 
 
It is also quite uncontroversial to say that Plato‟s theory of moral properties is consistent with 
the last claim of moral realism, which is that moral truths are objective in the sense explained 
earlier.  This is because of the way in which Plato characterises Forms.  In Plato‟s dialogues, 
Forms are consistently depicted as constituting a reality which is permanent and unchanging.  
That is to say, they exist eternally, or timelessly, and no Form‟s nature ever changes in any 
way.87  In addition, Forms are portrayed as potential objects of knowledge, as things which 
are to be discovered by humans rather than “created” by them.88  These features of Forms 
clearly show that Plato considers Forms to be objective in that their existence and nature are 
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entirely independent of human agency.  Therefore, moral properties and hence moral facts 
must be similarly objective in Plato‟s system. 
 
From what I have said in the last few paragraphs, it should be clear how Forms feature in 
Plato‟s particular version of moral realism.  As a theory of moral properties, the Forms 
constitute Plato‟s account of moral facts.  What makes a moral statement true is the state of 
affairs it describes actually obtaining, which means that a particular which is said to have a 
certain moral property actually does have that property.  In Plato‟s metaphysical system, 
having a moral property involves participating in the Form of that property.  Therefore, what 
constitutes a moral fact is the state of affairs in which a particular participates in the Form of 
a moral property. 
 
So far, I have shown how Plato‟s meta-ethics fits into the broad category of moral realism; 
now I shall explore how his position compares to the other varieties of moral realism I 
outlined earlier (naturalistic, non-naturalistic and supernaturalistic).  To do this, I will 
consider what Plato‟s meta-ethical position has in common with each of these theories and 
how it differs from them.  The purposes of this comparison are, first, to provide a fuller and 
clearer picture of Plato‟s moral realism and, secondly, to lay the groundwork for the 
evaluation of his position, which I shall undertake later in this section.  I shall argue that 
Plato‟s version of moral realism does not fit comfortably into any of the three subtypes of 
moral realism I have identified and that it should rather be considered a unique variety of 
realism.  However, Plato‟s position does have certain affinities with other forms of moral 
realism and this affects its plausibility as a meta-ethical theory. 
 
I will begin by considering whether Plato‟s version of moral realism has anything in common 
with supernaturalistic moral realism.  For Plato‟s meta-ethics to be classifiable as a kind of 
supernaturalistic moral realism it would have to be the case that he believes that moral 












properties would have to be supernatural in some way, or at least to have some supernatural 
origin.  There are certainly allusions to the supernatural – or more accurately, to the divine – 
scattered throughout Plato‟s works.  One theme which recurs, and which hints at some 
connection between morality and the divine, is the idea that to become morally good (or 
virtuous) is to become like God.89  This may seem to suggest that there is a supernatural 
element in Plato‟s ethics, and possibly even his meta-ethics. 
 
However, overall, there are (at most) very meagre motivations for classifying Plato‟s meta-
ethics as a kind of supernaturalistic moral realism.  There is no real evidence in Plato‟s 
dialogues to suggest that he considers Forms to have a divine nature or origin.  He never 
connects Forms explicitly to anything supernatural or divine, and his discussions of Forms do 
not typically include references to gods or any other supernatural entities.  In addition, even 
if Plato does say that to be morally good is to be like God, this by no means commits him to 
viewing moral value as having a divine origin.  First, when this claim is made in his dialogues, 
it appears in discussions of virtue and good character, not in discussions of Forms of moral 
properties.  Therefore, this claim could establish – at most – an indirect and rather tenuous 
link between moral properties and the divine.  Secondly, the view that to be morally good is 
to be like God is entirely consistent with the view that moral goodness is nonetheless 
independent of God – gods may well exemplify moral properties without creating them.90  It 
seems far more likely that this is Plato‟s position, considering the general absence of 
references to the supernatural in his discussions of Forms.  Consequently, it can be concluded 
that it would not be accurate to classify Plato‟s meta-ethics as a variety of supernaturalistic 
moral realism. 
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The next view to which I shall compare Plato‟s moral realism is naturalistic moral realism.  
One feature of his meta-ethical position, which appears to have some affinity with this 
version of moral realism, is the fact that he treats moral and non-moral properties as the 
same kinds of things.  Forms of value-neutral properties91 are related to particulars in the 
world in the same way as Forms of moral properties are related to particulars.  In Plato‟s 
system, being morally good, for example, is metaphysically similar to having any other 
property, such as being tall.  Plato also views value (not only moral but also aesthetic) as 
existing inherently and objectively in particulars in the world, just like other (non-moral) 
properties. 
 
Although this might seem to suggest that Plato views moral properties as being “natural” in 
some sense, it is clear that this sense of “natural” falls far short of the sense in which 
naturalistic moral realism views moral properties as “natural”.  The defining feature of 
naturalistic moral realism is the identification of moral and natural properties – it does not 
merely claim that moral and natural properties are metaphysically alike, but makes the 
stronger claim that moral properties are equivalent to natural properties.  Plato, however, 
never makes such an identification.  In fact, there are some passages in his dialogues in which 
he explicitly denies that moral goodness is equivalent to some other property such as 
pleasantness.92  It could be that Plato is actually a naturalistic moral realist but simply fails to 
identify which moral property ought to be equated with moral goodness, but this seems very 
unlikely.  The discussions of moral value in Plato‟s dialogues which fail to identify moral 
goodness with some other quality give the impression that goodness is something which 
transcends these other properties – not that it is merely some other, as yet undiscovered, 
natural property.  This is especially the case in the portion of the Republic which deals with 
the Form of the Good.  Socrates emphasises that the Form of the Good is more important 
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than all else (including the other Forms), but he never gives an account of what “the good” is 
because he refuses to identify it with some other property. 
 
If it is correct to say that it is not accurate to categorise Plato‟s meta-ethics as a form of 
naturalistic moral realism, it may appear more appropriate to classify him as a non-
naturalistic moral realist.  Plato‟s position does seem to have more in common with non-
naturalistic moral realism than with naturalistic moral realism because he denies that moral 
properties are to be identified with natural (non-moral) properties.   
 
However, I would argue that Plato‟s meta-ethics nonetheless does not fit altogether 
comfortably into the category of non-naturalistic moral realism.  The reason for this is that it 
seems anachronistic to impose the distinction between natural and non-natural properties 
upon Plato‟s metaphysical system.  Clearly I do believe that there are some aspects of Plato‟s 
thought which can be suitably analysed through the lens of later philosophical doctrines (this 
is what I have been doing all along), but this is one respect in which I think it is not 
appropriate to do so.  The distinction between natural and non-natural properties is one 
which Plato neither draws explicitly nor observes implicitly.  He does seem to recognise that 
there is some difference between value-laden properties and value-neutral properties, such as 
when he claims that there is far more disagreement about the former than about the latter, 
and that these disagreements are much more difficult to resolve.93  However, this is not 
sufficient to show that Plato views moral properties as being in a class of their own in the way 
in which non-naturalistic moral realism does.  Therefore, rather than trying to force Plato‟s 
moral realism into the mould of non-naturalism, it would be better to treat it as a unique 
form of moral realism and to remain attentive to its particular features, even if it does have a 
closer affinity with non-naturalistic moral realism than with either of the other two kinds of 
realism. 
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Now that I have illustrated how Plato‟s meta-ethical position fits into the broader tradition of 
moral realism, I shall evaluate Plato‟s particular version of moral realism by considering its 
main strengths and weaknesses.  First, I will give an overview of the principal advantages and 
disadvantages of moral realism, both generally and in the three subtypes I have identified.  
Then I shall consider whether, and to what extent, analogous arguments can be applied to 
Plato‟s moral realism in particular, as well as whether his version has any unique strengths 
and weaknesses of its own. 
 
The most appealing feature of moral realism, in its most general formulation, is that it 
resonates well with some common-sense beliefs about ethics and moral reasoning.  Moral 
realism is compatible, for example, with the following sorts of claims which many would 
ordinarily endorse: that moral statements can be true or false; that some moral statements 
are actually true; that there is something substantive at stake in moral disagreements; that 
one‟s moral beliefs can be correct or incorrect; and so on.  However, realism does have some 
general disadvantages.  As I have already indicated, moral realism bears the burden of giving 
an account of what constitutes a “moral fact” – without a satisfactory explanation of this, 
moral realism cannot survive.  In addition, a feature of realism which some might find 
objectionable is the claim that moral value is absolutely objective. That is to say, some people 
may not share the intuition that there is always a “moral truth” which is entirely independent 
of anyone‟s thoughts or beliefs. 
 
The arguments for and against each of the more specific varieties of moral realism can be 
analysed most easily by considering how each of them fares in relation to the other two, for 
the advantages of each form of moral realism lie mainly in their abilities to avoid the 
objections to the others. 
 
The difficulties with supernaturalistic moral realism are obvious and thus warrant only a 












the existence of the supernatural entity which is to be the source of moral properties must be 
established; and, it must be demonstrated that this entity is in fact the source of moral 
properties. 
 
Clearly both naturalistic and non-naturalistic moral realism have an immediate advantage 
over the supernaturalistic version because they do not rely on dubious supernatural 
elements.  Naturalistic moral realism has a further appeal because it typically involves 
identifying moral value with something conventionally considered to be good, such as 
pleasure.  However, this identification of natural and moral properties also presents a 
challenge to the theory, because the naturalistic moral realist must ide tify which natural 
properties will be plausible candidates for moral properties.  This may well prove difficult. 
 
Arguably, the most substantial objection to naturalistic moral realism is what is referred to as 
the “Open Question” argument”.94  This argument attacks the very heart of naturalistic moral 
realism by challenging the principle that moral properties are identical with natural 
properties.  To express this argument most accessibly, I shall use the example of a version of 
naturalistic moral realism which identifies goodness (a moral property) with pleasantness (a 
natural property).  Thus, on this view, whatever is pleasant is morally good.  The “Open 
Question” argument makes the claim that, if these properties were really equivalent, then 
anyone who understood the terms “good” and “pleasant” would know immediately, without 
any further information, that whatever was pleasant was also morally good.  But this is not 
the case, because it always makes sense to ask, of anything which is pleasant, whether that 
thing is also morally good.  Therefore, this argument concludes, moral properties cannot be 
identified with natural properties because it will always be an “open question” whether 
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something with the relevant natural property (in this case pleasantness) also has the further 
property of being morally good.95 
 
The greatest advantage of non-naturalistic moral realism is that it is immune to the 
objections levelled against naturalistic (and supernaturalistic) moral realism.  Because it does 
not claim that moral properties are natural properties, this version of moral realism does not 
face the challenge of identifying which natural properties are moral properties.  Non-
naturalistic moral realism is also in complete agreement with the “Open Question” 
argument‟s conclusion that moral properties are distinct from natural ones. 
 
This strand of moral realism, however, encounters a substantial difficulty, which is probably 
as serious as the problems with naturalistic moral realism.  The problem is that, in its basic 
form, non-naturalistic moral realism leaves the notion of “non-natural” properties entirely 
unexplained.96  Natural properties are not too difficult to grasp, but the idea of non-natural 
properties seems extremely obscure.  Despite its difficulties, naturalistic moral realism at 
least analyses moral properties in terms of other properties which are readily intelligible.  In 
contrast, non-naturalistic moral realism merely asserts that moral properties are an 
additional class of properties over and above natural ones, and the nature of the properties in 
this class remains entirely mysterious. 
 
I shall now consider how the above arguments might apply to Plato‟s meta-ethical position.  
Since this position is a variety of moral realism, it is reasonable to expect that it would have 
the same sort of strengths and weaknesses as moral realism in general.  To the extent that 
Plato endorses the broad claims of moral realism – for instance, that moral statements are 
capable of being true or false and that some are actually true – his meta-ethics has the 
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intuitive appeal of moral realism generally.  However, this appeal is limited in Plato‟s case 
because his specific version of realism is not very intuitive, considering that common-sense 
judgements about the status of moral propositions do not involve reference to Platonic 
Forms. 
 
Plato‟s meta-ethical position also encounters the same challenges as moral realism generally.  
The two broad difficulties with moral realism which I identified earlier were: that it needs to 
provide an account of “moral facts”, and that there may be reason to object to the absolute 
objectivity of moral value.  Plato is able to meet the first of these challenges because, as I have 
demonstrated, the theory of Forms can provide the necessary account of what constitutes a 
“moral fact”.  The second problem seems to pose a more severe objection to Plato‟s moral 
realism.  Other moral realists, like Plato, also view moral value as entirely objective, but at 
least some versions of moral realism will connect moral goodness to some human value.  For 
instance, some versions of naturalistic moral realism could equate moral goodness with some 
property which humans generally prize (such as pleasantness).  In contrast, Plato‟s view of 
the objectivity of moral value is more austere, as he conceives of moral properties in terms of 
abstract Forms rather than in terms of anything people actually value.  This is counter-
intuitive, and it might even be argued that it does not adequately capture the notion of what it 
means for something to be good.  Plato‟s meta-ethics is therefore especially vulnerable to the 
objection that moral realism is mistaken in considering moral value to be a purely objective 
matter. 
 
Some of the arguments for and against the three subtypes of moral realism do not affect 
Plato‟s version of moral realism, but others do have some relevance to his position.  Because 
Plato does not identify moral properties with either natural or supernatural properties, his 
view is not vulnerable to the objections against naturalistic or supernaturalistic moral 
realism.  Thus, his moral realism does not rely on controversial claims about supernatural 












respects, Plato‟s position has an advantage over both supernaturalistic and naturalistic moral 
realism. 
 
The principal objection to non-naturalistic moral realism does, however, have some force 
against Plato‟s moral realism.  I argued earlier that it would not be wholly appropriate to 
classify Plato‟s meta-ethics as a kind of non-naturalistic moral realism, but I also pointed out 
that it does have some affinity with this strand of realism.  It is in virtue of this affinity that 
Plato‟s view is susceptible to the objection to non-naturalistic moral realism. 
 
To repeat, the main weakness I identified in non-naturalistic moral realism was that the 
notion of a “non-natural” property was undesirably obscure.  Plato‟s moral realism can meet 
this challenge to some degree because he does provide some explanation of moral properties 
by reference to Forms, in contrast to basic forms of non-naturalistic moral realism which 
merely postulate non-natural (moral) properties without further explanation of such 
properties.  However, whatever explanatory advantage the Forms may give to Plato‟s account 
of moral properties is outweighed by the costs of invoking them in such an account.  Plato‟s 
account of moral properties requires the substantial ontological expansion of recognising an 
entire class of abstract entities.  Non-naturalistic moral realism could, at least, be less 
metaphysically ambitious in its view of moral properties.  As I argued earlier, postulating 
entities like Forms requires considerable justification and Plato has not provided adequate 
justification.  Therefore, although his position, unlike non-naturalistic moral realism, does 
provide some explanation of the nature of moral properties, this benefit is offset by the cost 
of appealing to Forms whose existence is dubious. 
 
In addition, Plato‟s moral realism cannot fully escape the charge of mysteriousness levelled 
against non-naturalistic moral realism.  Even though there is an account of moral properties 
in Plato‟s system, aspects of the theory of Forms remain inadequately clarified.  These 












particulars.  As a result, mysteriousness simply arises at a different level in Plato‟s theory – 
that is, at the level of explaining moral properties – than it does in non-naturalistic moral 
realism. 
 
This concludes my discussion of the metaphysical roles of the Forms in Plato‟s ethics.  In this 
section, I have demonstrated how the Forms can be interpreted as a theory of moral 
properties and I have analysed the meta-ethical position which is entailed by Plato‟s 
characterisation of Forms.  I have shown how the weaknesses in the metaphysical theory of 
Forms diminish its value as an account of moral properties, and I have argued that Plato‟s 
version of moral realism is problematic for three main reasons: first, because it involves the 
postulation of entities without adequate justification; secondly, because the Forms‟ account 
of moral facts is too obscure; and finally, because Plato‟s view on the absolute objectivity of 
moral value is not altogether plausible. 
 
What I have discussed in this section reveals one major facet of the convergence between 
Plato‟s ethics and metaphysics, namely, his metaphysics of moral value.  However, the issues 
covered here may not seem to have a very direct bearing on the details of Plato‟s moral theory 
outlined in Chapter III.  Plato‟s views on the moral character and the good life do not depend 
on the Forms as a theory of moral properties in any essential way, though it is not difficult to 
see how his metaphysical assumptions might influence his moral views.  Here are three 
examples.  First, the combination of Plato‟s moral and metaphysical theories would imply 
that an individual who has a certain moral quality (say, justice) would be related (in the 
appropriate way) to the Form of that quality (the Form of the Just).97  Secondly, that Plato 
conceives of moral goodness as something which transcends other properties, rather than as 
something which can be identified with a non-moral property (such as pleasantness), implies 
that there are certain moral principles he is unlikely to endorse (such as hedonism).  Thirdly, 
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Plato‟s view that moral properties, as Forms, are single, static unities would lead one to 
expect that these qualities are the same whenever they occur. 
 
Although such connections between Plato‟s metaphysics, meta-ethics, and ethics, can be 
drawn, it certainly does not seem that Plato‟s moral theory crucially depends, metaphysically, 
on Forms.  In other words, the main tenets of his ethical theory do not require these 
connections to the theory of Forms.  For example, one could maintain that justice is a virtue 
and that certain individuals are just without making any reference to a Form of the Just; one 
can reject principles like hedonism without believing that moral properties are Forms; and 
one can hold that a moral property is the same in all its instances without postulating a Form 
which unites these instances.  In summary, Plato‟s theory of Forms commits him to a realist 
meta-ethical position, but the Forms do not provide an essential metaphysical grounding for 
his moral theory. 
 
C. The Epistemological Roles of the Forms 
 
In this section, I shall consider possible epistemological connections between Plato‟s Forms 
and his moral theory.  To clarify, what I mean by “epistemological connections” are the ways 
in which Forms may feature in Plato‟s ethics in matters concerning knowledge.  The 
difference between the metaphysical connections I discussed in the previous section and the 
epistemological connections I shall discuss in this section is that the former concerns how 
Forms feature in Plato‟s views on moral properties, whereas the latter concerns how 
knowledge of Forms features in his moral views.  The epistemological links I shall now 
address are, in a sense, more directly related to the details of Plato‟s moral theory (outlined in 
Chapter III) than the metaphysical links, because they are concerned with Forms‟ roles in 
Plato‟s conceptions of good character and the ideal life.  However, most of these 
epistemological connections are only drawn implicitly in Plato‟s works, and some of those I 












metaphysical connections I discussed in the previous section, because those were quite 
clearly views to which Plato‟s theory of Forms commits him. 
 
I shall structure my analysis in this section around three main themes.  First, I will deal with 
roles that Forms might play in Plato‟s ethics with respect to moral knowledge.  Secondly, I 
will examine how Plato connects knowledge of Forms to his conception of good character.  
Thirdly, I will consider the place of knowledge of Forms in Plato‟s view of the ideal human 
life.  As will become evident in my discussion, these three themes are related and overlap to 
some extent.  I shall also pose three general objections to the epistemological connections 
between Forms and morality, and I will conclude that attempting to relate Forms 
(epistemologically) to ethics is generally problematic. 
 
Perhaps the most direct way of attempting to establish an epistemological connection 
between the Forms and morality would be to construe Forms as the objects of moral 
knowledge.  This might involve making a claim such as the following: since particulars in the 
world have moral properties in virtue of their relations to certain Forms, knowing the 
relevant Forms would entail having moral knowledge.  For example, if one knew the Form of 
the Just, this would seem to imply that one has moral knowledge, in that one would be able to 
distinguish which things were just and which were not. 
 
The possibility of such a connection between moral knowledge and knowledge of Forms 
warrants closer analysis.  It must be determined whether Plato makes this connection and, if 
he does, whether he is justified in doing so.  I shall consider two possible motivations for the 
claim that moral knowledge involves knowledge of Forms. 
 
The first motivation for attributing such a view to Plato is drawn from the “Socratic” 
dialogues in which the definition of some moral concept – usually a virtue – is sought.  In 












virtue is by showing what is common to all instances of that virtue.  It is possible that, in 
these cases, the aim of the dialogue is to characterise the Form of the quality in question.  For 
example, in the Euthyphro Socrates asks Euthyphro to tell him about “the form itself” by 
which all pious things are pious.98  This may appear to lend some support to the notion that 
moral knowledge involves knowledge of Forms, because it would imply that knowing a 
particular virtue requires knowing the Form of that virtue. 
 
This kind of argument, however, does not convincingly demonstrate that moral knowledge 
involves knowledge of Forms.  One problem is that, in the “Socratic” dialogues, Plato‟s theory 
of Forms is underdeveloped in comparison to his other works.  As a result, it is at least a little 
doubtful that these dialogues are aimed at discovering what the Forms of the relevant moral 
qualities are.  Another problem is that, even if knowing the nature of a certain virtue involves 
knowing the Form of that virtue, this does not imply that moral knowledge, in general, must 
involve knowledge of Forms.  Hence the ethical discussions of the “Socratic” dialogues do not 
provide a good reason to think that moral knowledge must be related to knowledge of 
Platonic Forms. 
 
The second possible motivation for thinking of Forms as the objects of moral knowledge can 
be derived from the view, expressed in some of Plato‟s works, that Forms are, in general, the 
only entities which can truly be the objects of knowledge.  This claim, if true, would seem to 
entail quite clearly that moral knowledge involves knowledge of Forms: if all knowledge is 
knowledge of Forms, it follows that moral knowledge must be knowledge of Forms. 
 
There are references in more than one of Plato‟s dialogues to the idea that only Forms can be 
the objects of knowledge, but one of the most direct discussions of this view takes place in the 
Republic when Socrates uses the image of a “divided line” to represent various levels of 
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cognition.99  In this passage Socrates claims that Forms are the objects of knowledge and are 
grasped by the intellect, in contrast to sensible particulars, which are perceived through the 
senses and are the objects only of opinion. 
 
A less direct, but still pertinent, source of support for the view that only Forms can be the 
objects of knowledge comes from the “knowledge argument”, based on the “constant flux” 
doctrine, which I covered in Chapter II.  To repeat, the principle of constant flux is the idea 
that objects in the sensible world are subject to continual change.  The “knowledge argument” 
adds to this the premises that: (i) what is in constant flux cannot be known; and (ii) 
knowledge is possible; it concludes that there must be Forms to serve as the objects of 
knowledge. 
 
The view that only Forms can be the objects of knowledge does not have much immediate 
plausibility, but it is understandable why Plato might be drawn to it, especially assuming he is 
sympathetic to the doctrine of constant flux.  However, there is insufficient reason either to 
accept the view that only Forms can be the objects of knowledge or to assume that Plato 
consistently endorses it.  Outside the Republic there is not a great deal of discussion of this 
idea in Plato‟s works.  More importantly, that only Forms can be the objects of knowledge is 
not an independently credible view.  As I demonstrated in Chapter II, the “knowledge 
argument” does not succeed in establishing that Platonic Forms exist, so it cannot show that 
only Forms can be the objects of knowledge.  The principle of constant flux requires further 
justification and does not clearly entail that sensible particulars cannot be the objects of 
knowledge.  Therefore, the view that only Forms can be the objects of knowledge is 
inadequately supported, which means that it cannot justify the view that moral knowledge 
must involve knowledge of Forms.  This attempt to establish an epistemological connection 
between Plato‟s ethics and metaphysics is unsuccessful. 
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The second general point at which Plato‟s ethics and his theory of Forms could interact 
(epistemologically) is in relation to his conception of moral character.  I shall explore two 
possible connections here.  The first relates to Plato‟s view that intellectual inquiry improves 
individual character, and the second is the suggestion that those who have knowledge of 
Forms have superior characters to those who lack this knowledge. 
 
That Plato considers intellectual inquiry to be beneficial to a person‟s character is not a 
controversial claim.  He sometimes states it quite explicitly in his writings,100 but it can also 
be inferred from the general mood of many of the discussions in his dialogues.  Whatever 
question the participants in Plato‟s dialogues are addressing, there is typically the sense that 
the process of reasoning through the issues is of great value in itself and beneficial to those 
taking part. 
 
Assuming, then, that Plato does believe that inquiry improves a person‟s character, what 
remains to be established is how this could create a connection between the theory of Forms 
and Plato‟s ethics.  Such a connection would be implied if it were the case that Forms are the 
objects of inquiry – or, in other words, if the purpose of inquiry were to achieve knowledge of 
Forms.  There would then be a clear relationship between morality and the theory of Forms: 
if intellectual inquiry leads to moral improvement and inquiry is aimed at knowledge of 
Forms, then pursuing knowledge of Forms leads to moral improvement. 
 
The claim that intellectual inquiry improves a person‟s character does not seem problematic, 
provided that one accepts a certain conception of good character.  Presumably such a 
conception would include traits like the capacity to think critically, the desire for one‟s 
decisions to be directed by knowledge, and so on.  This is not an objectionable view of good 
character, but what is potentially objectionable is the further claim that it is specifically 
inquiry into Forms which improves character.  To justify connecting Forms and ethics in this 
                                                        
100












way, it is necessary to show both that Plato endorses this claim and that the claim is itself 
plausible. 
 
There may be some reason to think that Plato believes that Forms are the objects of inquiry.  
For instance, in those dialogues where the discussants are attempting to clarify some 
important concept, it may be the case that these are attempts to grasp the Form of that 
concept.  However, this is an inadequate basis for believing either that Plato thinks all inquiry 
is aimed at knowledge of Forms, or that it is only inquiry into Forms which improves a 
person‟s character.  Some of Plato‟s dialogues certainly do not seem to be attempts to 
characterise a particular Form but rather involve inquiries into a variety of other important 
philosophical issues.  In addition, there is no good reason to believe that inquiry which is not 
concerned with Forms does not improve a person‟s character. 
 
The view that all inquiry is aimed at knowledge of Forms would follow from the claim, 
discussed earlier, that only Forms can be the objects of knowledge.  Clearly, if all knowledge 
is knowledge of Forms, and the purpose of intellectual inquiry is to achieve knowledge, then 
this inquiry must have knowledge of Forms as its goal.  But, as I argued earlier, the view that 
only Forms can be the objects of knowledge is highly dubious; thus, it does not seem 
plausible to say that Plato‟s ethics and metaphysics are connected because inquiry into Forms 
improves character. 
 
Another, somewhat related, point at which Plato‟s ethics seems to converge with his theory of 
Forms is in the view that individuals who have knowledge of Forms have superior characters 
to those who lack this knowledge.  Plato himself makes this connection quite explicitly in the 
Republic where he describes the philosophers who are to govern his ideal state.  These 












their access to the realm of the Forms.  This seems to indicate quite clearly that Plato does 
perceive at least some relationship between good character and knowledge of Forms.101 
 
The final epistemological connection between Plato‟s ethics and the theory of Forms which I 
shall consider is similarly based on the depiction of the philosophers in the Republic, but it 
also emerges implicitly elsewhere.  This relationship concerns not Plato‟s conception of good 
character, but rather his vision of the good life – it is the idea that knowledge of Forms, or the 
pursuit of such knowledge, is a component of a worthwhile life.  In the Republic, this is 
expressed in the suggestion that the best sort of life is the life of the philosopher who 
contemplates the Forms.102  However, this view is also suggested by Plato‟s consistent 
emphasis on the importance of intellectual pursuits and the value of Forms.  He depicts the 
Forms as a “superior” reality to the sensible world, and surely a life spent contemplating this 
superior reality is more worthwhile than one spent dealing with the mundane affairs of the 
material world. 
 
In addition to the arguments I have already discussed, I shall close this section by presenting 
three general objections to connecting Forms, epistemologically, to ethics.  The first deals 
with the Forms‟ place in Plato‟s vision of the good life, the second with the relationship 
between knowledge of Forms and moral character, and the third raises a general concern 
about Forms as objects of knowledge. 
 
I demonstrated in Chapter III that reason and intellectual inquiry are important components 
of Plato‟s conception of the ideal human life, and, in this chapter, I have indicated how Forms 
may feature in this conception because of Plato‟s emphasis on their value as objects of study.  
The view that knowledge is part of a worthwhile life is not really objectionable, but taking the 
further step of including Forms in this leads to a rather restricted view of the good life which 
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 The view that those who have knowledge of the Forms are morally superior to those who do not 
grasp the Forms may well seem objectionable, but I shall delay criticising it because this view is 
susceptible to some of the general arguments I shall consider towards the end of this section. 
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has little intuitive appeal.  It is perhaps understandable that Plato should consider the study 
of Forms to be the most worthwhile activity given his view that Forms are “more real” and 
hence more valuable than the sensible world.  However, it is difficult to see why a life spent 
contemplating Platonic Forms is the best kind of life.  Humans undoubtedly do place a great 
value on knowledge, but this vision of the good life is too austere to have much appeal. 
 
The second general objection I wish to raise relates to the relationship between knowledge of 
Forms and moral character.  As I have shown, Plato considers reason, knowledge and 
wisdom to be linked to virtue and good character.  This does not seem problematic, but again, 
when Forms are incorporated into this view it becomes implausible.  I have gestured at some 
of the ways in which Plato might connect knowledge of Forms to moral character, and I have 
suggested that, at the very least, he does seem to perceive some relationship between virtue 
and knowledge of Forms. What is implausible about this view is that it is not clear how 
having knowledge of Forms translates into having a virtuous character.  This is because the 
kind of knowledge achieved by studying Forms is very abstract and theoretical.  In contrast, it 
would be reasonable to expect that if virtue involves knowledge, this knowledge would be of a 
very practical kind.  Plato has not adequately demonstrated how the very abstract knowledge 
of Forms relates to having a good character.  It could quite reasonably be argued that virtue 
involves not the abstract understanding of theoretical entities, but rather sensitivity to the 
concrete details of particular situations. 
 
The final objection I shall propose is the most general of all.  Throughout this section I have 
been referring to how knowledge of Forms might relate to morality.  Plato, as well as many of 
his interpreters, speaks of “knowing” Forms as if the meaning of this notion is obvious or 
unproblematic.  However, it is far from obvious to me what is involved in “knowing” a Form.  
It is still unclear what exactly a Form is, how one comes to know a Form, or what is involved 












Form of the Just?  It surely cannot mean simply that she understands the concept of justice 
because Plato‟s characterisation of Forms presents them as entities, not merely as concepts. 
 
One possible explanation of what it might mean to know a Platonic Form is that it involves 
having a certain state of character.  This idea could perhaps be illustrated most clearly by 
applying it to the example of the Form of the Just and the character of the just individual 
presented in the Republic.  Thus, the suggestion would be that to know the Form of the Just 
is to have the character exhibited by the just individual in the Republic.  As I explained in 
Chapter III, this conception of the just character involves a particular arrangement of the 
individual‟s soul, with the rational element (reason) ruling the other parts of the soul.  
Therefore, a person whose soul was ordered in this way could be said to know the Form of the 
Just. 
 
This account of what it means to know a Form is especially attractive in the case of justice, 
because of the vivid description of the just individual which Plato gives in the Republic.  At a 
more general level, this explanation of knowledge of Forms also has some appeal.  It can, to 
some extent, clear up the mystery of what is involved in knowing a Platonic Form.  In 
addition, this account would create a very direct epistemological connection between the 
Forms and ethics, as well as a very close connection between knowledge and virtue.  As I 
argued in Chapter III, that virtue involves knowledge (or wisdom) is a significant theme in 
Plato‟s ethics.  Therefore, to define knowing the Form of a virtue as having that virtue would 
preserve the relationship between knowledge and virtue, while incorporating Forms in this 
relationship. 
 
However, this account of what it means to know a Form is not wholly satisfactory.  The first 
problem is that the account employs a rather strained conception of “knowledge”; the second 
problem is that it seems to undermine the epistemological component of virtue rather than 












Form in terms of having a particular state of character involves a significant departure from 
the ordinary understanding of what it is to know something.  The reason is that this view 
conflates knowing and being in a way which is, at best, unintuitive or, at worst, unintelligible.  
The second problem is that the equating of knowing the Form of a virtue with having that 
virtue seems to undermine the epistemological component of virtue.  If one wishes to 
understand virtue as involving knowledge, as Plato (arguably) does, then defining the 
relevant sort of “knowledge” in this way yields an unilluminating conception of virtue.  Saying 
that virtue involves knowledge of Forms, and then defining “knowledge of a Form” as having 
the virtue corresponding to that Form, is not very informative.  Therefore, trying to establish 
an epistemological connection between Plato‟s ethics and the theory of Forms by defining 
knowledge of Forms in this way is unlikely to yield a plausible view.  If “knowledge” is 
understood in its ordinary sense, then the puzzle about what it means to “know” a Platonic 
Form remains, and this seems objectionable. 
 
I have sought to demonstrate in this section that there are some epistemological connections 
between Plato‟s ethics and the theory of Forms which he makes quite explicitly, as well as 
others which are more tenuous.  What emerges from this discussion is that the attempts to 
make such connections are generally problematic.  The value Plato attaches to knowledge in 
his ethics, both in his conception of virtue and in his view of the ideal life, is not problematic 
in itself but becomes so when Forms are taken to be the objects of this knowledge.  As a 















I shall close with a brief summary of the conclusions I have reached in previous chapters, as 
well as some comments on what these conclusions might suggest about the interrelationships 
between different branches of philosophy, both in Plato‟s thought and in general. 
 
I began, in Chapter II, with a discussion of Plato‟s metaphysics by providing an exposition 
and assessment of his theory of Forms.  I highlighted the deficiencies in the theory of Forms 
and argued that it is, on the whole, a problematic metaphysical doctrine.  The main reasons 
for this are that Plato does not provide sufficient justification for the existence of Forms, nor 
does he adequately clarify the nature of these entities.  In addition, the theory of Forms is 
vulnerable to some powerful criticisms, most notably the problems of self-predication and 
the “Third Man” argument.   
 
In Chapter III, I provided an overview of Plato‟s moral theory, focusing on his conceptions of 
virtue and happiness as well as the relationship between the two.  I concluded that, although 
Plato‟s ethics is deficient in certain respects, the deficiencies in his moral theory are far less 
problematic than those in the theory of Forms. 
 
In Chapter IV, I analysed the connections between these two themes and I drew the following 
conclusions.  First, the Forms are problematic as a theory of moral properties because of the 
weaknesses in the theory of Forms identified in Chapter II.  Secondly, the variety of moral 
realism to which Plato is committed is an implausible meta-ethical position.  This is because 
the postulation of Forms is insufficiently justified, because the invocation of Forms makes the 
position mysterious, and because Plato‟s extreme view on the objectivity of moral value is 
very unintuitive.  Thirdly, I concluded that Plato‟s metaphysical views on moral value may 












Lastly, I argued that drawing epistemological connections between morality and the Forms is 
problematic.   
 
These conclusions should shed some light on how the different regions of Plato‟s thought fit 
together.  Given the tendency of 21st-century analytic philosophy to sharply compartmentalise 
the different areas of inquiry, it is illuminating to investigate the ways in which ancient 
philosophers like Plato weave these various issues together.  The connections between 
Platonic ethics and metaphysics which I have analysed here may be able to point to some 
more general insights about how different philosophical disciplines can interact, as well as 
whether such interactions are beneficial or harmful.  I shall close by considering a few such 
insights which emerge from my analyses. 
 
In Chapter IV, I gestured at some of the ways in which the Forms‟ implications for moral 
properties might (perhaps only indirectly) influence Plato‟s moral theory.  Although 
metaphysics and ethics are concerned with rather different sorts of questions, at least at a 
theoretical level it seems quite possible that metaphysical assumptions could influence moral 
principles.  Since metaphysics deals with the fundamental nature of reality, it would be 
reasonable to expect that someone‟s metaphysical beliefs could have some effect on his moral 
theory.  A metaphysical position like Plato‟s, which construes values as abstract and 
independently existing entities, may have very different results for an ethical theory from 
those of a metaphysical system which views values as something much more concrete or 
subjective. 
 
Having said that, however, I have also argued that Plato‟s ethics does not seem to depend on 
his metaphysics in any essential way.  This does not contradict the point made in the previous 
paragraph, but it does suggest that there may be limits on the extent to which metaphysics 












affected by metaphysical assumptions, it may be the case that ethical theorising does not 
necessarily depend on or presuppose any particular metaphysical worldview. 
 
My analysis of the interconnections within Plato‟s philosophy also shows how it can, in fact, 
be detrimental for an ethical theory to be based on, or to appeal to, a particular metaphysical 
doctrine. In Plato‟s case, the connections between his ethics and metaphysics are more 
harmful than beneficial because of the problems faced by the theory of Forms.  There is 
undoubtedly something very appealing about a holistic philosophical system like Plato‟s, but 
as I tried to show, constructing such a system which is comprehensive, consistent, and 
thoroughly plausible, is extremely difficult.  Nevertheless, there is good reason to admire the 
manner in which Plato attempts to integrate a range of diverse elements into a single grand 
structure, and in this dissertation I have sought to demonstrate some of the things which can 
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